Шхуна не тонет: security, infra и доки на русском.

Безопасность довёл до ума — Cursor-генерацию переписал руками.
IDOR закрыл, CSRF задушил, refresh rotation теперь как надо.
HSTS на staging, ENABLE_DOCS=false, install.env recovery протестил.

Backend:
- jwt_denylist + auth_epoch: мгновенный revoke access JWT (logout/block/reset)
- auth/admin/users: bump epoch, logout с Bearer, forgot_password skip для blocked
- install_secrets: путь всегда apps/api/data/secrets/ (bootstrap из корня не ломает Docker)
- seed: SEED_DEMO_USERS=false на prod/staging
- тесты: jwt revoke, integration, coverage gate 90%

Frontend:
- logout шлёт Bearer, обработка TOKEN_REVOKED
- guards TypeScript fix
- E2E: blocked user → 401 сразу после block

Infra:
- staging/prod compose, TLS nginx, deploy-скрипты
- k6 §17.2, backup/health/smoke scripts

Docs:
- docs/ на русском: project, security, deploy, release (старые md слили)
- README короткий + план ТЗ + стандартные логины dev

Код готов к плаванию. Капитан может идти писать фронт.
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# Compton Platform
Monorepo-lite project that follows the `docs/TZ.md` specification for the Compton platform.
Если вы открыли этот файл — поздравляем: перед вами monorepo с React, FastAPI и амбициями выйти в production. Амбиции живут в [docs/release.md](docs/release.md), код — в `apps/`, секреты — **не** в git.
## Stack
Платформа Compton Organic Tech: лендинг, auth, профиль, CMS, админка в стиле WESP/zootech. ТЗ: [docs/TZ.md](docs/TZ.md).
- **Frontend:** React 19, TypeScript, Vite, React Router, TanStack Query, Zustand, RHF + Zod, Ant Design (admin panel)
- **Backend:** FastAPI, SQLAlchemy 2, Alembic, Pydantic v2
- **Data/Infra:** PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO (S3-compatible), Docker Compose
- **Quality:** Vitest, Testing Library, Playwright, pytest, coverage gates in CI
## Repository Layout
- `apps/web` — frontend SPA
- `apps/api` — backend API (`app/core/crypto.py` — unified crypto; `app/core/install_secrets.py` — bootstrap/lock)
- `apps/api/data/secrets/` — per-install secrets (`install.env`, gitignored)
- `apps/api/data/compton_settings.json` — runtime panel settings (superuser-editable via API)
- `packages/shared-types` — generated API types contract target
- `packages/eslint-config` — shared eslint config package
- `infra` — docker/nginx/ci helper files
- `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` — optional override to expose DB/Redis/MinIO on host
## Quick Start
**Full stack in Docker** (API + DB + frontend — no local `pnpm install` required):
## Быстрый старт
```bash
# 1. Bootstrap install secrets — REQUIRED before the first docker compose up
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
# 2. Build and start everything
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py # один раз, до первого up
docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build
# 3. Verify (Windows PowerShell: use curl.exe, not curl — it is an alias for Invoke-WebRequest)
curl.exe http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health
curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health # Windows: curl.exe
```
Open [http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173) — static landing (`index.html`). SPA routes (`/login`, `/admin`, `/profile`, …) are served via `app.html` fallback in Vite dev/preview.
| URL | Что там |
|-----|---------|
| http://localhost:5173 | Лендинг `/` + SPA (`/login`, `/admin`, …) |
| http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health | API жив? |
| http://localhost:8000/api/v1/docs | OpenAPI (только dev) |
The `web` container runs Vite with hot-reload; dependencies are installed inside the container automatically.
**Логин для пробы:** `admin@compton.example` / `Admin1234``/admin`.
Log in as `admin@compton.example` (password `Admin1234` by default) and open `/admin`. See [Seed data](#seed-data) for all demo accounts.
> Bootstrap **до** первого `docker compose up`. Иначе Postgres скажет «password authentication failed» — см. [docs/deploy.md § восстановление](docs/deploy.md#восстановление-секретов).
**Optional** — copy env files if you also run API or frontend locally (hybrid mode):
**Не делайте:** Docker `web` и `pnpm --filter web dev` одновременно — оба хотят порт **5173**.
## Демо-аккаунты (dev)
Подробнее: [docs/deploy.md § стандартные логины](docs/deploy.md#стандартные-логины-dev).
| Email | Пароль | Env | Роль | Superuser |
|-------|--------|-----|------|-----------|
| admin@compton.example | Admin1234 | `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` | admin | да — Security, Diagnostics, secrets |
| ops@compton.example | OpsAdmin1234 | `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` | admin | нет — Users, Content, Activity |
| user@compton.example | User1234 | `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD` | user | — |
CMS после seed: `/pages/about`, `/pages/privacy`, `/pages/terms`.
В production/staging demo-users **выключены** (`SEED_DEMO_USERS=false`).
## Тесты
```bash
cp apps/api/.env.example apps/api/.env
cp apps/web/.env.example apps/web/.env
```
> **Important:** Run bootstrap **before** the first `docker compose up`. If Postgres was started without `install.env`, the API will fail with `password authentication failed for user "compton_app"`. Fix: `docker compose --profile docker-web down -v`, then bootstrap + up again. See [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting).
**Hybrid setup** (Docker API + local frontend):
```bash
cp apps/api/.env.example apps/api/.env
cp apps/web/.env.example apps/web/.env
pnpm install
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
docker compose up -d
pnpm --filter web dev
```
## Local Setup
### Prerequisites
- **Docker + Docker Compose** — enough for the full-stack Docker workflow
- **Node.js 22+ and pnpm 9+** — only if you run the frontend locally (`pnpm --filter web dev`)
- **Python 3.12** — bootstrap script, local API, or tests outside Docker
### Start services
| Mode | Command | What runs |
| ---- | ------- | --------- |
| **Full Docker (recommended)** | `docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build` | API, Postgres, Redis, MinIO, Vite on `:5173` |
| **API + infra only** | `docker compose up -d` | API, Postgres, Redis, MinIO — frontend locally |
| **Local API + local frontend** | see [Run applications](#run-applications) | everything on host |
| Service | URL / Port | Notes |
| --------- | ---------------------------------------------- | ----- |
| API | [http://localhost:8000](http://localhost:8000) | migrations + seed on startup |
| Web (dev) | [http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173) | Docker `--profile docker-web` or `pnpm --filter web dev` |
| Postgres | internal docker network | host access via `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` |
| Redis | internal docker network | host access via `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` |
| MinIO | internal docker network | host access via `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` |
> Do not run Docker `web` and `pnpm --filter web dev` at the same time — both bind port **5173**.
The Docker `web` container bind-mounts source for live-reload on Windows/macOS (`CHOKIDAR_USEPOLLING=true`); `node_modules` stay isolated inside the container.
### Install secrets
Each project copy gets unique runtime secrets generated once and locked forever (prevents accidental rotation and DB credential mismatch).
| File | Purpose |
| ---- | ------- |
| `apps/api/data/secrets/install.env` | PostgreSQL, JWT, S3/MinIO credentials (gitignored) |
| `apps/api/data/secrets/install.meta.json` | Install ID and lock timestamp (gitignored) |
**Bootstrap (required before first `docker compose up`):**
```bash
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
```
Generated keys: `POSTGRES_USER`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `DATABASE_URL`, `JWT_ACCESS_SECRET`, `JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER`, `S3_SECRET_KEY`, `MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD`.
Docker Compose passes `install.env` directly into the `api`, `postgres`, and `minio` services — no root `.env` or `--env-file` flag needed.
- Re-run is safe: existing locked secrets are never overwritten.
- API entrypoint also calls `ensure_install_secrets()` on startup (adopts env vars when migrating from an older setup).
- **Do not rotate** `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` / JWT secrets after first bootstrap without a coordinated DB migration — see [docs/secrets-recovery.md](docs/secrets-recovery.md).
**Host access to DB/Redis/MinIO** (DBeaver, pgAdmin, MinIO console):
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev-ports.yml up -d
```
| Exposed port | Service |
| ------------ | ------- |
| 5432 | PostgreSQL |
| 6379 | Redis |
| 9000 / 9001 | MinIO API / console |
**Reveal credentials:** Admin → Security → Install Secrets (superuser only, audited). Supports `database_password`, `jwt_access_secret`, `jwt_refresh_pepper`, `s3_secret_key`.
### Configure environment
For hybrid or fully local dev, copy example env files:
```bash
cp apps/api/.env.example apps/api/.env
cp apps/web/.env.example apps/web/.env
```
Key variables:
| Variable | App | Purpose |
| ----------------------------------------- | --- | ---------------------------------------------------- |
| `DATABASE_URL` | api | PostgreSQL connection string |
| `APP_ENV` | api | `development` / `production` startup guards |
| `JWT_ACCESS_SECRET`, `JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER` | api | Token signing (32+ bytes) |
| `VITE_API_URL` | web | Local dev: `http://localhost:8000`. Docker `web`: `http://api:8000` |
| `VITE_USE_API_PROXY` | web | `true` — proxy `/api` through Vite (default in dev) |
| `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE` | api | `memory` (Docker dev) or `smtp` (real mail) |
| `STORAGE_MODE` | api | `s3` (MinIO) or `memory` (tests) |
| `S3_*` | api | MinIO/S3 credentials and bucket |
| `CORS_ORIGINS` | api | Must include `http://localhost:5173` |
| `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES` | api | `true` only for E2E (email token helper) |
| `TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS` | api | Which proxy IPs may set `X-Forwarded-For` |
| `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` | api | Seed password for superuser admin |
| `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD` | api | Seed password for regular demo user |
| `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` | api | Seed password for ops admin (no superuser) |
| `ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT` | api | Rate limiting (required `true` in production) |
| `COOKIE_SECURE` | api | HttpOnly refresh cookie `Secure` flag |
| `COMPTON_SETTINGS_PATH` | api | Path to runtime settings JSON (default `data/compton_settings.json`) |
In dev the frontend proxies API requests through Vite (`/api` → backend). Locally the target is `localhost:8000`; in Docker Compose it is the `api` service.
### Runtime settings (`compton_settings.json`)
Non-secret runtime toggles live in `apps/api/data/compton_settings.json` and are applied on API startup. Superusers can read/update them via `GET/PATCH /admin/settings`.
Env vars with the same keys (e.g. `ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT`, `CORS_ORIGINS`) act as **locks** — when set, the corresponding JSON field cannot be changed from the admin panel.
Typical fields: rate limit, API docs, secure cookie, JWT TTL, CORS origins, SMTP host/port, avatar limits, audit retention.
### Install dependencies (hybrid / local dev only)
Skip if you use `docker compose --profile docker-web` — dependencies are installed inside the `web` container.
```bash
pnpm install
pip install -r apps/api/requirements-dev.txt
```
### Run applications
**Option A — Full Docker stack:**
```bash
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py # first run only
docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build
```
**Option B — Docker API + local frontend:**
```bash
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py # first run only
docker compose up -d
pnpm --filter web dev
```
**Option C — Local API + local frontend:**
```bash
cd apps/api
alembic upgrade head
uvicorn app.main:app --reload --app-dir .
```
In another terminal:
```bash
pnpm --filter web dev
```
Open [http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173).
### Seed data
After migrations the database is seeded on every API startup with demo users and CMS pages. Passwords come from env vars (defaults in `.env.example`):
| Email | Env variable | Default (dev) | Role | Superuser | Access |
| ----- | ------------ | --------------- | ---- | --------- | ------ |
| `admin@compton.example` | `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` | `Admin1234` | `admin` | yes | Full admin + Security/Diagnostics/Install Secrets |
| `ops@compton.example` | `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` | `OpsAdmin1234` | `admin` | no | Users, Content, Activity (no Security/Diagnostics) |
| `user@compton.example` | `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD` | `User1234` | `user` | no | Profile only |
**Content pages:** `about`, `privacy`, `terms` (published).
> Change demo passwords via env before first seed in production. Admin-created users must pass the shared password policy (length, complexity, denylist).
## Frontend Routes
The project uses a **dual-entry** frontend:
| Entry | Served at | Purpose |
| ----- | --------- | ------- |
| `index.html` | `/` | Public marketing landing (static HTML/CSS/JS in `main/`) |
| `app.html` | `/login`, `/register`, `/profile`, `/admin`, `/pages/:slug`, … | React SPA (auth, profile, admin, CMS pages) |
Vite middleware rewrites SPA paths to `app.html` on dev/preview (`vite.main-static.ts`).
| Path | Page | Access |
| ------------------ | --------------------- | ----------------------- |
| `/` | Landing (`index.html`)| public |
| `/login` | Login | guest |
| `/register` | Registration | guest |
| `/verify` | Email verification | public |
| `/forgot-password` | Password reset request| guest |
| `/reset-password` | Set new password | public (with token) |
| `/pages/:slug` | CMS page | public (published only) |
| `/profile` | Profile CRUD + avatar | authenticated |
| `/admin` | Admin panel | role `admin` |
**Auth model:** one login flow for everyone. The `is_superuser` flag on admin accounts controls access to critical panel sections (Security, Diagnostics, Install Secrets reveal, runtime settings). Regular admins see Users, Content, and Activity only.
- **Access JWT** — in memory only (Zustand), not in `localStorage` / `sessionStorage`.
- **Refresh token** — HttpOnly cookie (`Path=/api/v1/auth`, `SameSite=Lax`), rotated on each refresh.
- **Session restore on reload** — `AuthBootstrap` calls a deduplicated `bootstrapSessionRefresh()` when a session hint exists in `sessionStorage` **or** the current path is protected (`/admin`, `/profile`). Guards wait for `bootstrapped` before redirecting.
- **After login** — admins go to `/admin`, regular users to `/profile`.
Admin users can return to the public landing via the **«На сайт»** topbar link (full navigation to `/`, not client-side React routing).
## API Overview
Base URL: `http://localhost:8000/api/v1`
| Area | Endpoints |
| ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Health** | `GET /health` |
| **Auth** | `POST /auth/register`, `/login`, `/logout`, `/refresh`, `/verify-email`, `/forgot-password`, `/reset-password` |
| **Profile** | `GET/PATCH /users/me`, `POST /users/me/password`, `POST /users/me/avatar` |
| **Content** | `GET /content/pages`, `GET /content/pages/{slug}`, admin: `POST/PATCH/DELETE /content/pages`, `GET /content/pages/manage/all` |
| **Admin** | `GET/PATCH /admin/users`, `POST /admin/users`, `PATCH /admin/users/{id}/password`, `GET /admin/stats`, `GET/PATCH /admin/settings`, `GET /admin/diagnostics/report`, `GET /admin/activity-feed`, `POST /admin/ui-activity`, `GET /admin/server-log`, `GET /admin/secrets`, `POST /admin/secrets/reveal` |
| **Media** | `GET /media/files/{path}` |
OpenAPI docs (when `ENABLE_DOCS=true`): [http://localhost:8000/api/v1/docs](http://localhost:8000/api/v1/docs)
## Database Migrations
```bash
cd apps/api
alembic upgrade head # apply schema
alembic downgrade -1 # rollback one revision
```
Tables: `users`, `user_profiles`, `refresh_tokens`, `password_reset_tokens`, `email_verification_tokens`, `content_pages`.
**Security constraints** (PostgreSQL, migration `20260714_0004`):
- `CHECK` on `users.role`, `users.status`, `content_pages.status`
- Superuser rule: `is_superuser=true` only when `role=admin`
- Indexes on `expires_at` for token tables
Expired tokens are cleaned up on API startup (`cleanup_expired_tokens`, 30-day retention).
## Auth Email (SMTP)
- Verify/reset use one-time opaque tokens (SHA-256 hash + pepper in DB, TTL 1 hour); raw token omitted from production email bodies
- Env: `SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_FROM`, `FRONTEND_URL`, `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE`
- Docker dev: `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=memory` (no real SMTP required)
- Local SMTP: Mailpit/Mailhog on `localhost:1025` (`SMTP_HOST=localhost`, `SMTP_PORT=1025`)
- Tests: `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=memory` (in-memory outbox)
## Profile & Avatar (MinIO)
- `GET/PATCH /api/v1/users/me`, `POST /api/v1/users/me/password`, `POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar`
- Avatar: jpeg/png/webp, max 2 MB, re-encoded via Pillow (SVG rejected)
- Storage env: `STORAGE_MODE` (`s3` or `memory`), `S3_ENDPOINT`, `S3_ACCESS_KEY`, `S3_SECRET_KEY`, `S3_BUCKET`
- Local dev: MinIO on `localhost:9000` (console `9001`), bucket `compton` (created on API startup)
- Tests: `STORAGE_MODE=memory` (in-memory file store, no MinIO)
## Admin Panel
- Route: `/admin` (`AdminGuard`, role `admin`)
- UI: WESP-style **Ant Design** shell with fixed left sidebar, content topbar, and a dedicated admin theme system
- Topbar actions:
- **Light/Dark** — toggles isolated admin theme (preference persisted in `localStorage`)
- **«На сайт»** — opens the static landing at `/` (`index.html`) via full navigation
- **Logout** — revokes refresh cookie and redirects to `/login`
- Reload UX: no blocking «Loading…» screens; admin routes preload the current admin background (`#f6f6f4` in Light, `#1f2229` in Dark) to avoid flash
- Sections:
- **Users** — list/create/patch role, status, password
- **Content** — CMS CRUD
- **Security** *(superuser only)* — runtime toggles + Install Secrets reveal
- **Diagnostics** *(superuser only)* — security health checks (JWT, CORS, DB credentials, SSL mode, token table size, install secrets lock)
- **Activity** — admin audit feed + server log tail
- Business rules: last admin protected, no self-demotion, no self-block; critical endpoints require `is_superuser`
### Auth UI (zootech)
Auth pages (`/login`, `/register`, `/forgot-password`, `/reset-password`, `/verify`) use a WESP-inspired zootech card layout with organic theme tokens (`#48816d`, centered card, icon inputs). `AppHeader` is hidden on auth routes and in `/admin`.
## Tests
```bash
# Frontend unit/component (coverage ≥ 85%)
pnpm --filter web test:ci
# Same, inside Docker web container (when pnpm is not installed on host)
docker compose --profile docker-web exec web sh -c "cd apps/web && pnpm test:ci"
# Backend unit/integration (coverage ≥ 90%)
pnpm --filter web test:ci # frontend, cov ≥ 85%
cd apps/api && python -m pytest --cov=app --cov-fail-under=90
# E2E regression (Playwright §15.7, 16 critical scenarios)
pnpm --filter web e2e
pnpm --filter web e2e # Playwright, API :8001
```
### E2E (Playwright)
## Документация
- `pnpm --filter web e2e` starts a dedicated API (`:8001`) and Vite (`:5175`) — does not conflict with dev on `:5173` or Docker API on `:8000`
- Uses SQLite + `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=memory` + `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=true`
- Test email tokens: `GET /api/v1/test/emails/latest-token` (only when test routes enabled)
- Reuse running API: `E2E_START_API=false E2E_API_URL=http://localhost:8000 pnpm --filter web e2e`
- Install browsers once: `pnpm --filter web exec playwright install chromium`
Вся нормальная дока — в **`docs/`**, на русском, без водянистого README на 500 строк:
## Troubleshooting
| Файл | О чём |
|------|-------|
| [docs/README.md](docs/README.md) | Оглавление |
| [docs/project.md](docs/project.md) | Структура, архитектура, API, маршруты |
| [docs/security.md](docs/security.md) | Auth, JWT revoke, секреты, чеклист prod |
| [docs/deploy.md](docs/deploy.md) | Dev/staging/prod, бэкапы, troubleshooting |
| [docs/release.md](docs/release.md) | QA gates, k6, ZAP, go-live |
| [docs/TZ.md](docs/TZ.md) | Техническое задание |
| Problem | Solution |
| ------- | -------- |
| **`docker compose up` fails: install.env missing** | Run `python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py` before first start |
| **API exits: `password authentication failed for user "compton_app"`** | Postgres volume was initialized before bootstrap. Reset local dev data: `docker compose --profile docker-web down -v`, bootstrap again, then `docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build`. See [docs/secrets-recovery.md](docs/secrets-recovery.md) |
| **Login failed** with correct credentials | Check API: `curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health`. Ensure `apps/web/.env` exists for local frontend. Restart: `docker compose restart web` or `pnpm --filter web dev` |
| **401 on `/auth/refresh` in browser console (guest)** | Expected for logged-out users on public pages — refresh is skipped unless a session hint or protected path (`/admin`, `/profile`) triggers bootstrap |
| **Logged out after F5 on `/admin`** | Usually a failed refresh (expired cookie) or stale Docker web build. Rebuild: `docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build web`. Log in again if the refresh cookie expired |
| **«На сайт» in admin does nothing / goes to login** | Must use full navigation to `/` (static landing), not React Router. Ensure topbar action is `href="/"`, then rebuild web container if behavior persists |
| **White flash on admin reload** | `app.html` preloads admin background before React mount. Verify `localStorage.wespAdminTheme` and rebuild web if stale assets are served |
| **Sidebar should stay visible while scrolling** | Admin sidebar is fixed on desktop (`position: fixed`, `height: 100vh`) and switches back to normal flow on mobile (`<=768px`) |
| **Port 5173 already in use** | Stop Docker web: `docker compose --profile docker-web stop web`. Or stop local Vite |
| **Frontend in Docker: missing modules / esbuild errors** | Rebuild: `docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build web`. Do not run `pnpm install` on the host for the Docker workflow |
| **Hot-reload not working in Docker (Windows/macOS)** | Enabled via `CHOKIDAR_USEPOLLING=true`. Restart: `docker compose --profile docker-web restart web` |
| **Admin panel missing Security/Diagnostics tabs** | Log in as `admin@compton.example` (superuser), not `ops@compton.example` |
| **Need DB password for DBeaver** | Admin → Security → Install Secrets → Reveal DB password (superuser), then `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` |
| **Lost `install.env` / DB auth failed** | See [docs/secrets-recovery.md](docs/secrets-recovery.md). Do not regenerate secrets if Postgres volume already exists |
| **CORS errors in browser console** | Keep `VITE_USE_API_PROXY=true` (default in dev). Do not call `localhost:8000` directly from the browser |
## Работа с Git
## Security Highlights
**Репозиторий:** https://git.groupkomton.ru/Matvey/site.git
**Ветка:** `main` (одна ветка, без сюрпризов)
All cryptographic primitives live in a single module (`apps/api/app/core/crypto.py`); `security.py` and `media_signing.py` re-export from it.
```bash
git pull origin main # перед работой — всегда
git status && git diff # перед коммитом — тоже всегда
git add .
git commit -m "Сделал то-то на русском"
git push origin main
```
| Layer | Mechanism |
| ----- | --------- |
| **Passwords** | bcrypt cost 12 with per-user salt (embedded in hash); shared denylist |
| **Access JWT** | HS256, short TTL, in-memory on frontend only |
| **Refresh tokens** | HttpOnly cookie (`Path=/api/v1/auth`), rotation + family reuse detection; SHA-256 hash with server-side **pepper** |
| **Email/reset tokens** | Opaque tokens, SHA-256 + pepper in DB; raw token never stored |
| **Media URLs** | HMAC-SHA256 signed paths with TTL |
| **Install secrets** | `secrets.token_*` generation; generate-once + lock; superuser reveal (audited) |
**Коммиты — только на русском.** Плохо: `fix`, `WIP`, `asdf`.
**Auth & API**
**Не коммитить:** `.env`, `install.env`, `node_modules/`, логи, кэши.
- Refresh token rotation and reuse-detection (family revoke)
- Rate limiting and brute-force lockout (`ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT=true` in Docker compose)
- Pending/blocked users rejected on refresh; frontend clears session on `403` (`ACCOUNT_BLOCKED`, `EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED`)
- Origin/Referer validation on cookie-based auth endpoints
- `TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS` — only listed proxies may influence client IP via `X-Forwarded-For`
- Email bodies omit raw tokens in production (`EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=memory` or `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=true` only)
**Не делать** `git push --force` на `main` без согласования.
**Data & infra**
| Команда | Зачем |
|---------|-------|
| `git log --oneline -10` | что было |
| `git checkout -- файл` | откатить файл |
| `git stash` / `git stash pop` | спрятать / вернуть правки |
- PostgreSQL/Redis/MinIO on internal Docker network by default (no host ports)
- DB CHECK constraints, connection pool tuning, startup token cleanup
- CMS HTML sanitization (bleach) with allowed URL protocols: `http`, `https`, `mailto`
- Signed avatar URLs; RBAC + superuser guards on admin routes
- Admin password policy on user create/reset
## План по ТЗ (§16)
**Production guards** (`APP_ENV=production` — API refuses to start if):
| Фаза | Задачи | Статус |
|------|--------|--------|
| **0 — Подготовка** | Monorepo, Docker Compose, UI kit, CI/coverage gates, Playwright smoke | Выполнено |
| **1 — MVP** | Landing, Auth+SMTP, Profile, Content, Admin, staging + полный регресс | В процессе |
| **2 — v1.0** | Celery/notifications, Catalog+Orders, Analytics, k6 + monitoring | Когда начнём? |
| **3 — Scale** | Read replica PG, Celery workers, CDN, horizontal API | Когда начнём? |
- `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=true`
- `ENABLE_DOCS=true`
- `ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT=false`
- `COOKIE_SECURE=false`
- Default DB credentials (`user:pass`) or placeholder JWT secrets
- `DATABASE_URL` without `sslmode=require`
### Фаза 1 — детализация
## Related Documentation
| # | Задача | Модули | Статус |
|---|--------|--------|--------|
| 1.1 | Landing (перенос заглушки) | landing | Выполнено |
| 1.2 | Auth + SMTP | auth | Выполнено |
| 1.2b | Security baseline | core, auth | В процессе |
| 1.3 | Profile CRUD + avatar | profile | Выполнено |
| 1.4 | Content pages | content | Выполнено |
| 1.5 | Admin panel | admin | Выполнено |
| 1.6 | Staging deploy + полный регресс (§15.7) | — | В процессе |
- [docs/secrets-recovery.md](docs/secrets-recovery.md) — recover from lost install secrets
- [docs/security-checklist.md](docs/security-checklist.md) — pre-production security checklist
- [docs/TZ.md](docs/TZ.md) — full technical specification
Критерии приёмки MVP — §17.1 ТЗ (k6 50 CCU, Lighthouse ≥85, E2E 10/10, coverage gates).
## MVP Status (Phase 1)
---
| # | Feature | Status |
| --- | ----------------------------- | ------ |
| 1.1 | PostgreSQL + Alembic + seed | done |
| 1.2 | Auth + SMTP (verify/reset) | done |
| 1.3 | Profile CRUD + avatar (MinIO) | done |
| 1.4 | Content pages | done |
| 1.5 | Admin panel (Ant Design + zootech auth UI) | done |
| 1.6 | E2E regression §15.7 | done |
*Дальше — [docs/](docs/README.md). Там схемы, таблицы и вещи, которые не помещаются в README без страданий.*
+1
View File
@@ -40,3 +40,4 @@ DEMO_USER_PASSWORD=User1234
DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD=OpsAdmin1234
# E2E only, never enable in production.
ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=false
SEED_DEMO_USERS=true
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# Production API environment (non-secret keys). Secrets live in data/secrets/install.env
APP_ENV=production
ENABLE_DOCS=false
ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=false
COOKIE_SECURE=true
ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT=true
EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=smtp
SEED_DEMO_USERS=false
JWT_ACCESS_TTL_MIN=15
JWT_REFRESH_TTL_DAYS=30
STORAGE_MODE=s3
S3_BUCKET=compton
S3_REGION=us-east-1
AVATAR_MAX_BYTES=2097152
MEDIA_URL_TTL_SECONDS=600
LOG_LEVEL=INFO
AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS=90
COMPTON_SETTINGS_PATH=data/compton_settings.json
ADMIN_AUDIT_LOG_PATH=data/logs/admin-audit.jsonl
SERVER_LOG_PATH=data/logs/server.log
PASSWORD_DENYLIST_PATH=data/security/password-denylist.txt
# Set on server: FRONTEND_URL, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS, SMTP_*, DATABASE_URL (via install.env)
+1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
admin_initial_password: str = "Admin1234"
demo_user_password: str = "User1234"
demo_ops_password: str = "OpsAdmin1234"
seed_demo_users: bool = True
smtp_host: str = "localhost"
smtp_port: int = 1025
smtp_user: str = ""
+2
View File
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ def verify_password(raw_password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
def create_access_token(user_id: str, role: str, is_superuser: bool = False) -> str:
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.jwt_denylist import get_auth_epoch
now = datetime.now(UTC)
payload = {
"sub": user_id,
"role": role,
"is_superuser": is_superuser,
"auth_epoch": get_auth_epoch(user_id),
"iat": int(now.timestamp()),
"exp": int((now + timedelta(minutes=settings.jwt_access_ttl_min)).timestamp()),
"jti": generate_secret_token_hex(16),
+7
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
from app.core.jwt_denylist import validate_access_claims
from app.core.security import decode_access_token
from app.modules.users.repository import get_user_by_id
@@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ def get_current_user(credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None = Depends(
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="UNAUTHORIZED")
try:
payload = decode_access_token(credentials.credentials)
validate_access_claims(payload)
except ValueError as exc:
detail = str(exc)
if detail == "TOKEN_REVOKED":
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="TOKEN_REVOKED")
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="INVALID_TOKEN") from exc
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="INVALID_TOKEN") from exc
user = get_user_by_id(payload["sub"])
+2 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ from uuid import uuid4
from app.core.crypto import generate_install_bundle
INSTALL_SECRETS_DIR = Path("data/secrets")
_API_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
INSTALL_SECRETS_DIR = _API_ROOT / "data" / "secrets"
INSTALL_SECRETS_FILE = INSTALL_SECRETS_DIR / "install.env"
INSTALL_SECRETS_META_FILE = INSTALL_SECRETS_DIR / "install.meta.json"
REQUIRED_KEYS = (
+108
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@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
"""Redis-backed JWT jti denylist and per-user auth_epoch for instant access revocation."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.redis import get_redis_client
AUTH_EPOCH_PREFIX = "auth:epoch:"
JWT_DENY_PREFIX = "jwt:deny:"
_memory_epochs: dict[str, int] = {}
_memory_denied_jti: dict[str, float] = {}
def _purge_expired_memory_jtis() -> None:
now = time.time()
expired = [jti for jti, exp in _memory_denied_jti.items() if exp <= now]
for jti in expired:
_memory_denied_jti.pop(jti, None)
def ensure_jwt_revocation_backend() -> None:
if settings.app_env.lower() != "production":
return
if get_redis_client() is None:
raise RuntimeError("Redis is required for JWT revocation in production")
def get_auth_epoch(user_id: str) -> int:
client = get_redis_client()
if client is not None:
try:
value = client.get(f"{AUTH_EPOCH_PREFIX}{user_id}")
return int(value) if value is not None else 0
except Exception:
if settings.app_env.lower() == "production":
raise
return _memory_epochs.get(user_id, 0)
def bump_auth_epoch(user_id: str) -> int:
client = get_redis_client()
if client is not None:
try:
return int(client.incr(f"{AUTH_EPOCH_PREFIX}{user_id}"))
except Exception:
if settings.app_env.lower() == "production":
raise
next_epoch = _memory_epochs.get(user_id, 0) + 1
_memory_epochs[user_id] = next_epoch
return next_epoch
def deny_jti(jti: str, exp: int) -> None:
if not jti:
return
ttl = max(int(exp - time.time()), 1)
client = get_redis_client()
if client is not None:
try:
client.setex(f"{JWT_DENY_PREFIX}{jti}", ttl, "1")
return
except Exception:
if settings.app_env.lower() == "production":
raise
_purge_expired_memory_jtis()
_memory_denied_jti[jti] = time.time() + ttl
def is_jti_denied(jti: str) -> bool:
if not jti:
return False
client = get_redis_client()
if client is not None:
try:
return bool(client.exists(f"{JWT_DENY_PREFIX}{jti}"))
except Exception:
if settings.app_env.lower() == "production":
return True
_purge_expired_memory_jtis()
return jti in _memory_denied_jti
def revoke_access_token(token: str) -> None:
from app.core.security import decode_access_token
try:
payload = decode_access_token(token)
except Exception:
return
jti = payload.get("jti")
exp = payload.get("exp")
if jti and exp:
deny_jti(str(jti), int(exp))
def validate_access_claims(payload: dict) -> None:
user_id = payload.get("sub")
if not user_id:
raise ValueError("INVALID_TOKEN")
jti = payload.get("jti")
if jti and is_jti_denied(str(jti)):
raise ValueError("TOKEN_REVOKED")
token_epoch = int(payload.get("auth_epoch", 0))
if token_epoch != get_auth_epoch(str(user_id)):
raise ValueError("TOKEN_REVOKED")
+1
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ def run_seed(include_demo_pages: bool = True) -> None:
is_superuser=True,
status="active",
)
if settings.seed_demo_users and settings.app_env.lower() != "production":
_ensure_user(
email="user@compton.example",
password=settings.demo_user_password,
+2
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from app.core.install_secrets import ensure_install_secrets
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.jwt_denylist import ensure_jwt_revocation_backend
from app.core.app_settings import bootstrap_settings
from app.core.storage import ensure_bucket
from app.core import database as db_module
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
async def lifespan(_: FastAPI):
ensure_install_secrets()
bootstrap_settings()
ensure_jwt_revocation_backend()
_assert_production_guards()
if settings.enable_test_routes:
Base.metadata.create_all(db_module.engine)
+3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from app.core.app_settings import apply_settings_to_app, get_settings_payload, w
from app.core.audit_log import read_audit_events, write_audit_event
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.install_secrets import install_secrets_payload, reveal_install_secret
from app.core.jwt_denylist import bump_auth_epoch
from app.core.security import hash_password
from app.modules.admin.security_diagnostics import build_security_diagnostics_report
from app.modules.auth.service import revoke_user_refresh_family
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ def patch_user(
if status:
target.status = status
if status == "blocked":
bump_auth_epoch(target.id)
revoke_user_refresh_family(target.id)
repository.update_user(target)
write_audit_event(
@@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ def reset_user_password(admin_user, target_user_id: str, password: str) -> dict:
raise ValueError("USER_NOT_FOUND")
target.password_hash = hash_password(password)
repository.update_user(target)
bump_auth_epoch(target.id)
revoke_user_refresh_family(target.id)
write_audit_event(
action="admin.user.reset_password",
+18 -7
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
from app.core.datetime_utils import ensure_utc, utc_now
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.datetime_utils import ensure_utc, utc_now
from app.core.redis import check_rate_limit, client_ip
from app.modules.auth.schemas import (
ForgotPasswordIn,
@@ -15,16 +16,17 @@ from app.modules.auth.schemas import (
from app.modules.auth.service import (
forgot_password,
login,
logout,
refresh,
register,
resend_verification,
reset_password,
revoke_refresh_token,
verify_email_token,
)
from app.modules.users import repository
router = APIRouter()
optional_bearer = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
def _allowed_origins() -> set[str]:
@@ -139,7 +141,12 @@ async def refresh_route(request: Request, response: Response):
check_rate_limit(f"refresh:{client_ip(request)}", limit=30, window_seconds=60)
try:
access_token, new_refresh, user = refresh(refresh_token)
except PermissionError:
except PermissionError as exc:
detail = str(exc)
if detail == "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED":
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED")
if detail == "ACCOUNT_BLOCKED":
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="ACCOUNT_BLOCKED")
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="INVALID_REFRESH")
_set_refresh_cookie(response, new_refresh)
return {
@@ -156,11 +163,15 @@ async def refresh_route(request: Request, response: Response):
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout_route(request: Request, response: Response):
async def logout_route(
request: Request,
response: Response,
credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None = Depends(optional_bearer),
):
_enforce_origin(request, require_header=True)
refresh_token = request.cookies.get("refresh_token")
if refresh_token:
revoke_refresh_token(refresh_token)
access_token = credentials.credentials if credentials else None
logout(refresh_token, access_token)
response.delete_cookie(
"refresh_token",
path="/api/v1/auth",
+19 -7
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from uuid import uuid4
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.datetime_utils import ensure_utc, utc_now
from app.core.email import send_template_email
from app.core.jwt_denylist import bump_auth_epoch, revoke_access_token
from app.core.security import (
create_access_token,
generate_opaque_token,
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ def resend_verification(email: str) -> None:
def forgot_password(email: str) -> None:
user = repository.get_user_by_email(email)
if not user:
if not user or user.status == "blocked":
return
token = _issue_password_reset_token(user.id)
_send_password_reset_email(user, token)
@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ def reset_password(token: str, new_password: str) -> None:
user.password_hash = hash_password(new_password)
repository.update_user(user)
auth_repository.mark_password_reset_token_used(token_hash)
bump_auth_epoch(user.id)
revoke_user_refresh_family(user.id)
@@ -199,18 +201,21 @@ def refresh(refresh_token: str) -> tuple[str, str, User]:
token_row = auth_repository.get_refresh_token(token_hash)
if not token_row:
raise PermissionError("INVALID_REFRESH")
user = repository.get_user_by_id(token_row.user_id)
if not user:
raise PermissionError("INVALID_REFRESH")
if user.status == "pending":
raise PermissionError("EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED")
if user.status == "blocked":
raise PermissionError("ACCOUNT_BLOCKED")
if token_row.revoked_at is not None:
auth_repository.revoke_family_tokens(token_row.family_id)
raise PermissionError("INVALID_REFRESH")
if ensure_utc(token_row.expires_at) < utc_now():
raise PermissionError("EXPIRED_REFRESH")
user = repository.get_user_by_id(token_row.user_id)
if not user:
raise PermissionError("INVALID_REFRESH")
if user.status in {"pending", "blocked"}:
raise PermissionError("INVALID_REFRESH")
auth_repository.revoke_refresh_token(token_hash)
new_refresh = issue_refresh_token(user.id, family_id=token_row.family_id)
access = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
@@ -224,5 +229,12 @@ def revoke_refresh_token(refresh_token: str) -> None:
auth_repository.revoke_family_tokens(token_row.family_id)
def logout(refresh_token: str | None, access_token: str | None) -> None:
if access_token:
revoke_access_token(access_token)
if refresh_token:
revoke_refresh_token(refresh_token)
def revoke_user_refresh_family(user_id: str) -> None:
auth_repository.revoke_user_families(user_id)
+2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
from app.core.jwt_denylist import bump_auth_epoch
from app.core.security import hash_password, verify_password
from app.modules.auth.service import revoke_user_refresh_family
from app.modules.media.service import upload_user_avatar
@@ -26,4 +27,5 @@ def change_password(user: User, current_password: str, new_password: str) -> Non
raise ValueError("INVALID_CURRENT_PASSWORD")
user.password_hash = hash_password(new_password)
repository.update_user(user)
bump_auth_epoch(user.id)
revoke_user_refresh_family(user.id)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from app.core.install_secrets import ensure_install_secrets
from app.core.config import settings
INITIAL_REVISION = "20260711_0001"
HEAD_REVISION = "20260714_0005"
SCHEMA_TABLES = (
"content_pages",
"email_verification_tokens",
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ def wait_for_database(max_attempts: int = 30, delay_seconds: float = 1.0):
"Local dev fix — deletes Docker DB data:\n"
" docker compose --profile docker-web down -v\n"
" docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build\n"
"See docs/secrets-recovery.md"
"See docs/deploy.md#восстановление-секретов"
)
raise RuntimeError(f"Database is unavailable: {detail}{hint}") from last_error
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
import json
import pytest
from app.core.app_settings import (
_coerce_value,
apply_settings_to_app,
bootstrap_settings,
env_locks,
get_settings_payload,
write_settings,
)
def test_write_and_bootstrap_settings(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
settings_file = tmp_path / "compton_settings.json"
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.app_settings.settings.compton_settings_path", str(settings_file))
monkeypatch.delenv("ENABLE_DOCS", raising=False)
merged = write_settings({"enable_docs": False, "log_level": "INFO"})
assert merged["enable_docs"] is False
assert settings_file.exists()
bootstrap_settings()
from app.core.config import settings
assert settings.enable_docs is False
def test_env_locks_skip_locked_keys(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
settings_file = tmp_path / "compton_settings.json"
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.app_settings.settings.compton_settings_path", str(settings_file))
monkeypatch.setenv("ENABLE_DOCS", "true")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.app_settings.settings.enable_docs", True)
write_settings({"enable_docs": False})
payload = get_settings_payload()
assert payload["locks"]["enable_docs"] is True
assert payload["values"]["enable_docs"] is True
def test_apply_settings_coerces_list_and_bool(monkeypatch):
apply_settings_to_app({"enable_docs": "false", "cors_origins": "http://a.test,http://b.test"})
from app.core.config import settings
assert settings.enable_docs is False
assert settings.cors_origins == ["http://a.test", "http://b.test"]
assert isinstance(env_locks(), dict)
def test_read_settings_ignores_invalid_payload(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
settings_file = tmp_path / "compton_settings.json"
settings_file.write_text("[]", encoding="utf-8")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.app_settings.settings.compton_settings_path", str(settings_file))
from app.core.app_settings import read_settings
assert read_settings() == {}
def test_coerce_value_rejects_invalid_list():
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="INVALID_LIST_cors_origins"):
_coerce_value("cors_origins", 123)
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
from app.core.audit_log import read_audit_events, write_audit_event
def test_audit_log_roundtrip(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
audit_file = tmp_path / "admin-audit.jsonl"
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.audit_log.settings.admin_audit_log_path", str(audit_file))
write_audit_event("admin.user.patch", "u1", "admin@example.com", {"target": "u2"})
events = read_audit_events()
assert len(events) == 1
assert events[0]["action"] == "admin.user.patch"
assert events[0]["details"]["target"] == "u2"
def test_read_audit_events_ignores_invalid_json(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
audit_file = tmp_path / "admin-audit.jsonl"
audit_file.write_text('{"action":"ok"}\nnot-json\n', encoding="utf-8")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.audit_log.settings.admin_audit_log_path", str(audit_file))
events = read_audit_events()
assert len(events) == 1
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
from app.core.dependencies import get_current_user, require_admin, require_superuser
from app.core.security import create_access_token, hash_password
from app.modules.users.repository import create_user, update_user
def test_get_current_user_rejects_missing_credentials():
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_current_user(None)
assert exc.value.status_code == 401
def test_get_current_user_rejects_pending_user():
user = create_user("pending-dep@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="pending")
token = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
credentials = HTTPAuthorizationCredentials(scheme="Bearer", credentials=token)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_current_user(credentials)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
assert exc.value.detail == "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED"
def test_get_current_user_rejects_blocked_user():
user = create_user("blocked-dep@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
user.status = "blocked"
update_user(user)
token = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
credentials = HTTPAuthorizationCredentials(scheme="Bearer", credentials=token)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_current_user(credentials)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
assert exc.value.detail == "ACCOUNT_BLOCKED"
def test_get_current_user_rejects_invalid_token():
credentials = HTTPAuthorizationCredentials(scheme="Bearer", credentials="not-a-jwt")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_current_user(credentials)
assert exc.value.status_code == 401
assert exc.value.detail == "INVALID_TOKEN"
def test_get_current_user_rejects_unknown_user():
token = create_access_token("missing-user-id", "user", False)
credentials = HTTPAuthorizationCredentials(scheme="Bearer", credentials=token)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
get_current_user(credentials)
assert exc.value.status_code == 401
def test_require_admin_rejects_regular_user():
user = create_user("regular-dep@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), role="user", status="active")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
require_admin(user)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
def test_require_superuser_rejects_non_super_admin():
user = create_user("ops-dep@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), role="admin", status="active")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
require_superuser(user)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
assert exc.value.detail == "SUPERUSER_ONLY"
+29
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from app.core.email import SmtpMailer, get_mailer, memory_mailer, send_template_email
def test_memory_mailer_latest_token():
memory_mailer.clear()
send_template_email(
to="user@example.com",
template="verify_email",
subject="Verify",
body="Open link\nTOKEN:abc123\n",
)
assert memory_mailer.latest_token("user@example.com", "verify_email") == "abc123"
def test_smtp_mailer_sends_message(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.email_delivery_mode", "smtp")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.smtp_from", "noreply@example.com")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.smtp_host", "localhost")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.smtp_port", 1025)
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.smtp_user", "")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.email.settings.smtp_password", "")
smtp_instance = MagicMock()
with patch("app.core.email.smtplib.SMTP") as smtp_cls:
smtp_cls.return_value.__enter__.return_value = smtp_instance
get_mailer().send("user@example.com", "Subject", "Body", "verify_email")
smtp_instance.send_message.assert_called_once()
+115
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@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from app.core import install_secrets as secrets
@pytest.fixture
def secrets_dir(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch):
install_dir = tmp_path / "secrets"
install_file = install_dir / "install.env"
meta_file = install_dir / "install.meta.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(secrets, "INSTALL_SECRETS_DIR", install_dir)
monkeypatch.setattr(secrets, "INSTALL_SECRETS_FILE", install_file)
monkeypatch.setattr(secrets, "INSTALL_SECRETS_META_FILE", meta_file)
return install_dir, install_file, meta_file
def test_read_install_secrets_empty_when_missing(secrets_dir):
_, install_file, _ = secrets_dir
assert not install_file.exists()
assert secrets.read_install_secrets() == {}
def test_write_and_read_install_secrets_roundtrip(secrets_dir):
install_dir, install_file, _ = secrets_dir
install_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
install_file.write_text(
"JWT_ACCESS_SECRET=abc\n# comment\nPOSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
values = secrets.read_install_secrets()
assert values["JWT_ACCESS_SECRET"] == "abc"
assert values["POSTGRES_PASSWORD"] == "secret"
def test_sync_minio_s3_secrets_aligns_keys():
values = {
"S3_ACCESS_KEY": "minio",
"MINIO_ROOT_USER": "minio",
"MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD": "root-secret",
"S3_SECRET_KEY": "old-secret",
}
synced = secrets._sync_minio_s3_secrets(values)
assert synced["S3_SECRET_KEY"] == "root-secret"
def test_masked_database_url_hides_password():
masked = secrets.masked_database_url("postgresql://user:pass@localhost:5432/compton")
assert "pass" not in masked
assert "user:***" in masked
def test_install_secrets_payload_reports_status(secrets_dir):
install_dir, install_file, _ = secrets_dir
install_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
install_file.write_text(
"\n".join(
[
"SECRETS_LOCKED=true",
"DATABASE_URL=postgresql://compton_app:secret@postgres:5432/compton",
"JWT_ACCESS_SECRET=abc",
"JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER=def",
"POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret",
"S3_SECRET_KEY=key",
]
)
+ "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
payload = secrets.install_secrets_payload()
assert payload["initialized"] is True
assert payload["locked"] is True
assert payload["database"]["user"] == "compton_app"
assert "***" in payload["connection_string_masked"]
def test_reveal_install_secret_supported_and_unsupported(secrets_dir):
install_dir, install_file, _ = secrets_dir
install_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
install_file.write_text("JWT_ACCESS_SECRET=top-secret\n", encoding="utf-8")
assert secrets.reveal_install_secret("jwt_access_secret") == "top-secret"
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="UNSUPPORTED_SECRET_KEY"):
secrets.reveal_install_secret("unknown")
def test_ensure_install_secrets_creates_locked_bundle(secrets_dir, monkeypatch):
install_dir, install_file, meta_file = secrets_dir
monkeypatch.delenv("DATABASE_URL", raising=False)
status = secrets.ensure_install_secrets()
assert status.created is True
assert status.locked is True
assert install_file.exists()
assert meta_file.exists()
values = secrets.read_install_secrets()
assert values["SECRETS_LOCKED"] == "true"
assert values["JWT_ACCESS_SECRET"]
def test_ensure_install_secrets_adopts_existing_locked_file(secrets_dir):
install_dir, install_file, meta_file = secrets_dir
install_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
install_file.write_text(
"SECRETS_LOCKED=true\nJWT_ACCESS_SECRET=existing\nJWT_REFRESH_PEPPER=pepper\n"
"POSTGRES_PASSWORD=pw\nPOSTGRES_USER=u\nPOSTGRES_DB=db\nDATABASE_URL=postgresql://u:pw@localhost/db\n"
"S3_ACCESS_KEY=a\nS3_SECRET_KEY=b\nMINIO_ROOT_USER=a\nMINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=b\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
meta_file.write_text('{"install_id":"x","locked_at":"2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"}\n', encoding="utf-8")
status = secrets.ensure_install_secrets()
assert status.created is False
assert status.locked is True
assert secrets.read_install_secrets()["JWT_ACCESS_SECRET"] == "existing"
+119
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from app.core import jwt_denylist as denylist_module
from app.core.jwt_denylist import (
bump_auth_epoch,
deny_jti,
ensure_jwt_revocation_backend,
get_auth_epoch,
is_jti_denied,
revoke_access_token,
validate_access_claims,
)
from app.core.security import create_access_token, hash_password
from app.modules.users.repository import create_user
def test_auth_epoch_bump_invalidates_token():
user = create_user("epoch-user@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
token = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
from app.core.security import decode_access_token
payload = decode_access_token(token)
validate_access_claims(payload)
bump_auth_epoch(user.id)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="TOKEN_REVOKED"):
validate_access_claims(payload)
def test_deny_jti_blocks_specific_token():
user = create_user("jti-user@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
token = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
from app.core.security import decode_access_token
payload = decode_access_token(token)
deny_jti(payload["jti"], payload["exp"])
assert is_jti_denied(payload["jti"])
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="TOKEN_REVOKED"):
validate_access_claims(payload)
def test_revoke_access_token_helper():
user = create_user("revoke-user@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
token = create_access_token(user.id, user.role, user.is_superuser)
revoke_access_token(token)
from app.core.security import decode_access_token
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="TOKEN_REVOKED"):
validate_access_claims(decode_access_token(token))
def test_get_auth_epoch_defaults_to_zero():
assert get_auth_epoch("missing-user-id") == 0
def test_validate_access_claims_rejects_missing_sub():
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="INVALID_TOKEN"):
validate_access_claims({})
def test_production_is_jti_denied_fail_closed(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.exists.side_effect = RuntimeError("redis down")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
assert is_jti_denied("any-jti") is True
def test_revoke_access_token_ignores_invalid_token():
revoke_access_token("not-a-jwt")
def test_bump_auth_epoch_production_raises_when_redis_fails(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.incr.side_effect = RuntimeError("redis down")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
bump_auth_epoch("user-x")
def test_empty_jti_is_not_denied():
assert is_jti_denied("") is False
deny_jti("", 9999999999)
def test_ensure_jwt_revocation_backend_requires_redis_in_production(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=None):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Redis is required"):
ensure_jwt_revocation_backend()
def test_get_auth_epoch_production_raises_when_redis_fails(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.get.side_effect = RuntimeError("redis down")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
get_auth_epoch("user-y")
def test_deny_jti_production_raises_when_redis_fails(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.setex.side_effect = RuntimeError("redis down")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):
deny_jti("jti-123", int(__import__("time").time()) + 3600)
def test_memory_denylist_purges_expired_jti(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module, "_memory_denied_jti", {"expired-jti": 1.0})
assert is_jti_denied("expired-jti") is False
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
from app.main import create_app
from app.core.config import settings
def test_create_app_includes_test_routes_when_enabled(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", True)
app = create_app()
paths = set(app.openapi()["paths"])
assert "/api/v1/test/emails/latest-token" in paths
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
from app.core.password_denylist import is_denied_password
from app.core.password_denylist import is_denied_password, load_denylist
def test_password_denylist_blocks_common_password():
assert is_denied_password("password123")
def test_password_denylist_loads_custom_entries(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
denylist_file = tmp_path / "denylist.txt"
denylist_file.write_text("# comment\nCustomBad1\n", encoding="utf-8")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.password_denylist.settings.password_denylist_path", str(denylist_file))
denylist = load_denylist()
assert "custombad1" in denylist
assert is_denied_password("CustomBad1")
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from app.main import _assert_production_guards
from app.core.config import settings
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def reset_app_env(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "development")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cookie_secure", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_access_secret", "dev-access-secret-32bytes-minimum!!")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_refresh_pepper", "dev-refresh-pepper-32bytes-minimum!!")
monkeypatch.setattr(
settings,
"database_url",
"postgresql+psycopg://compton_app:secret@postgres:5432/compton?sslmode=require",
)
def test_production_guards_skip_in_development():
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_test_routes(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES"):
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_insecure_cookie(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="COOKIE_SECURE"):
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_default_db_credentials(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cookie_secure", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "database_url", "postgresql://user:pass@db/app?sslmode=require")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Default database credentials"):
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_placeholder_jwt(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cookie_secure", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_access_secret", "change-me-access")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="JWT_ACCESS_SECRET"):
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_placeholder_refresh_pepper(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cookie_secure", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_access_secret", "prod-access-secret-32bytes-minimum!!")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_refresh_pepper", "change-me-pepper")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER"):
_assert_production_guards()
def test_production_guards_reject_missing_sslmode(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "app_env", "production")
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_docs", False)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "cookie_secure", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "database_url", "postgresql://app:secret@db/app")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="sslmode=require"):
_assert_production_guards()
+32
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.redis import check_rate_limit, client_ip, _buckets
def test_check_rate_limit_uses_memory_fallback(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_rate_limit", True)
_buckets.clear()
with patch("app.core.redis.get_redis_client", return_value=None):
check_rate_limit("memory-key", limit=1, window_seconds=60)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
check_rate_limit("memory-key", limit=1, window_seconds=60)
assert exc.value.status_code == 429
def test_client_ip_honors_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "trusted_proxy_ips", "127.0.0.1")
request = MagicMock(spec=Request)
request.headers = {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.10, 127.0.0.1"}
request.client.host = "127.0.0.1"
assert client_ip(request) == "203.0.113.10"
def test_client_ip_unknown_without_client():
request = MagicMock(spec=Request)
request.headers = {}
request.client = None
assert client_ip(request) == "unknown"
+10 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
from app.core.storage import ensure_bucket
from app.core.storage import download_object, ensure_bucket, memory_store, upload_object
def test_ensure_bucket_noop_in_memory():
ensure_bucket()
def test_memory_storage_roundtrip():
memory_store.clear()
upload_object("avatars/test.png", b"abc", "image/png")
payload = download_object("avatars/test.png")
assert payload == (b"abc", "image/png")
assert download_object("missing") is None
@@ -71,3 +71,39 @@ def test_superuser_can_create_and_delete_user(client):
deleted = client.delete(f"/api/v1/admin/users/{user_id}", headers=_admin_headers(client))
assert deleted.status_code == 200
assert deleted.json()["status"] == "deleted"
def test_admin_summary_and_stats(client):
headers = _admin_headers(client)
summary = client.get("/api/v1/admin/summary", headers=headers)
assert summary.status_code == 200
assert "users_count" in summary.json()
stats = client.get("/api/v1/admin/stats", headers=headers)
assert stats.status_code == 200
def test_superuser_diagnostics_and_server_log(client):
headers = _admin_headers(client)
diagnostics = client.get("/api/v1/admin/diagnostics/report", headers=headers)
assert diagnostics.status_code == 200
assert "checks" in diagnostics.json()
activity = client.get("/api/v1/admin/activity-feed", headers=headers)
assert activity.status_code == 200
assert "events" in activity.json()
server_log = client.get("/api/v1/admin/server-log", headers=headers)
assert server_log.status_code == 200
assert "lines" in server_log.json()
def test_admin_ui_activity(client):
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/admin/ui-activity",
json={"event": "tab_open", "meta": {"tab": "users"}},
headers=_admin_headers(client),
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["status"] == "ok"
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
from app.modules.admin.security_diagnostics import build_security_diagnostics_report
def test_build_security_diagnostics_report_returns_checks():
report = build_security_diagnostics_report()
assert "checks" in report
assert len(report["checks"]) >= 10
ids = {check["id"] for check in report["checks"]}
assert "jwt_access_secret" in ids
assert "install_secrets_locked" in ids
+56 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
from unittest.mock import patch
from app.modules.admin.service import patch_user
from app.modules.admin.service import (
create_admin_user,
delete_admin_user,
get_server_log_tail,
patch_user,
reset_user_password,
)
from app.modules.users import repository
from app.modules.users.repository import create_user, get_user_by_email
from app.core.security import hash_password
@@ -31,3 +37,52 @@ def test_last_admin_protected():
assert False, "Expected last-admin protection"
except ValueError as exc:
assert str(exc) == "LAST_ADMIN_PROTECTED"
def test_admin_cannot_self_block():
admin = get_user_by_email("admin@compton.example")
try:
patch_user(admin, admin.id, None, "blocked")
assert False, "Expected self-block error"
except ValueError as exc:
assert str(exc) == "SELF_BLOCK_FORBIDDEN"
def test_reset_user_password_revokes_sessions():
admin = get_user_by_email("admin@compton.example")
target = create_user("reset-pw@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
result = reset_user_password(admin, target.id, "NewValid123")
assert result["status"] == "ok"
def test_delete_admin_user_forbidden_for_self():
admin = get_user_by_email("admin@compton.example")
try:
delete_admin_user(admin, admin.id)
assert False, "Expected self-delete error"
except ValueError as exc:
assert str(exc) == "SELF_DELETE_FORBIDDEN"
def test_create_admin_user_rejects_duplicate_email():
admin = get_user_by_email("admin@compton.example")
try:
create_admin_user(
admin,
email="user@compton.example",
password="Valid123",
role="user",
is_superuser=False,
status="active",
)
assert False, "Expected duplicate user error"
except ValueError as exc:
assert str(exc) == "USER_EXISTS"
def test_get_server_log_tail_empty_when_missing():
with patch("app.modules.admin.service.settings") as mock_settings:
mock_settings.server_log_path = "/tmp/compton-missing-log.txt"
payload = get_server_log_tail()
assert payload["lines"] == []
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
from app.core.security import create_access_token, hash_password
from tests.helpers import register_and_verify
def _admin_headers(client) -> dict[str, str]:
from app.modules.users.repository import get_user_by_email
admin = get_user_by_email("admin@compton.example")
token = create_access_token(admin.id, admin.role, admin.is_superuser)
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
def test_blocked_user_access_token_revoked_after_admin_block(client):
register_and_verify(client, "blocked-jwt@example.com")
login = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login",
json={"email": "blocked-jwt@example.com", "password": "Valid123"},
)
assert login.status_code == 200
access_token = login.json()["access_token"]
me = client.get("/api/v1/users/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
assert me.status_code == 200
user_id = me.json()["user"]["id"]
blocked = client.patch(
f"/api/v1/admin/users/{user_id}",
headers=_admin_headers(client),
json={"status": "blocked"},
)
assert blocked.status_code == 200
revoked = client.get("/api/v1/users/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
assert revoked.status_code == 401
assert revoked.json()["detail"] == "TOKEN_REVOKED"
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from app.core import jwt_denylist as denylist_module
from app.core.jwt_denylist import (
bump_auth_epoch,
deny_jti,
ensure_jwt_revocation_backend,
get_auth_epoch,
is_jti_denied,
)
def test_ensure_jwt_revocation_backend_requires_redis_in_production(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(denylist_module.settings, "app_env", "production")
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=None):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="Redis is required"):
ensure_jwt_revocation_backend()
def test_redis_auth_epoch_roundtrip():
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.get.return_value = "3"
mock_client.incr.return_value = 4
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
assert get_auth_epoch("user-1") == 3
assert bump_auth_epoch("user-1") == 4
mock_client.incr.assert_called_once()
def test_redis_deny_jti_and_check():
mock_client = MagicMock()
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.get_redis_client", return_value=mock_client):
with patch("app.core.jwt_denylist.time.time", return_value=1000):
deny_jti("abc-jti", 1060)
mock_client.setex.assert_called_once_with("jwt:deny:abc-jti", 60, "1")
mock_client.exists.return_value = 1
assert is_jti_denied("abc-jti") is True
def test_forgot_password_skips_blocked_user(client):
from app.modules.users.repository import create_user, get_user_by_email, update_user
from app.core.security import hash_password
create_user("blocked-forgot@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
user = get_user_by_email("blocked-forgot@example.com")
user.status = "blocked"
update_user(user)
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/forgot-password",
json={"email": "blocked-forgot@example.com"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
from app.core.email import memory_mailer
assert not any(msg.to == "blocked-forgot@example.com" for msg in memory_mailer.sent)
def test_logout_revokes_access_token(client):
from tests.helpers import register_and_verify
register_and_verify(client, "logout-jti@example.com")
login = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login",
json={"email": "logout-jti@example.com", "password": "Valid123"},
)
token = login.json()["access_token"]
logout = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Origin": "http://localhost:5173"},
)
assert logout.status_code == 200
me = client.get("/api/v1/users/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
assert me.status_code == 401
assert me.json()["detail"] == "TOKEN_REVOKED"
@@ -12,6 +12,31 @@ def _admin_headers(client) -> dict[str, str]:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
def test_refresh_fails_for_pending_user(client):
client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={"email": "pending-refresh@example.com", "password": "Valid123"},
)
login = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login",
json={"email": "pending-refresh@example.com", "password": "Valid123"},
)
assert login.status_code == 403
assert login.json()["detail"] == "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED"
# Simulate stale refresh cookie from an earlier active session edge case via direct token issue.
from app.modules.auth.service import issue_refresh_token
from app.modules.users.repository import get_user_by_email
user = get_user_by_email("pending-refresh@example.com")
refresh_token = issue_refresh_token(user.id)
client.cookies.set("refresh_token", refresh_token, path="/api/v1/auth")
refresh = client.post("/api/v1/auth/refresh", headers={"Origin": "http://localhost:5173"})
assert refresh.status_code == 403
assert refresh.json()["detail"] == "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED"
def test_refresh_fails_for_blocked_user(client):
register_and_verify(client, "blocked-refresh@example.com")
login = client.post(
@@ -32,7 +57,8 @@ def test_refresh_fails_for_blocked_user(client):
)
assert blocked.status_code == 200
refresh = client.post("/api/v1/auth/refresh", headers={"Origin": "http://localhost:5173"})
assert refresh.status_code == 401
assert refresh.status_code == 403
assert refresh.json()["detail"] == "ACCOUNT_BLOCKED"
def test_refresh_requires_origin_header_when_cookie_present(client):
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from app.core.security import hash_password
from app.modules.auth import repository as auth_repository
from app.modules.auth.service import issue_refresh_token, refresh
from app.modules.users.repository import create_user, get_user_by_id, update_user
def test_refresh_returns_account_blocked_for_blocked_user():
user = create_user("blocked-svc@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
token = issue_refresh_token(user.id)
user.status = "blocked"
update_user(user)
auth_repository.revoke_user_families(user.id)
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="ACCOUNT_BLOCKED"):
refresh(token)
def test_refresh_returns_email_not_verified_for_pending_user():
user = create_user("pending-svc@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="pending")
token = issue_refresh_token(user.id)
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED"):
refresh(token)
def test_refresh_rejects_revoked_token_for_active_user():
user = create_user("active-svc@example.com", hash_password("Valid123"), status="active")
token = issue_refresh_token(user.id)
auth_repository.revoke_user_families(user.id)
with patch.object(auth_repository, "revoke_family_tokens") as revoke_family:
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="INVALID_REFRESH"):
refresh(token)
revoke_family.assert_called_once()
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.email import memory_mailer
from app.main import create_app
def _test_client(monkeypatch) -> TestClient:
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "enable_test_routes", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "email_delivery_mode", "memory")
return TestClient(create_app())
def test_latest_email_token_route(monkeypatch):
client = _test_client(monkeypatch)
memory_mailer.clear()
memory_mailer.send(
to="token-route@example.com",
subject="Verify",
body="TOKEN:route-token\n",
template="verify_email",
)
response = client.get(
"/api/v1/test/emails/latest-token",
params={"to": "token-route@example.com", "template": "verify_email"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["token"] == "route-token"
def test_latest_email_token_route_missing_token(monkeypatch):
client = _test_client(monkeypatch)
response = client.get(
"/api/v1/test/emails/latest-token",
params={"to": "missing@example.com", "template": "verify_email"},
)
assert response.status_code == 404
assert response.json()["detail"] == "TOKEN_NOT_FOUND"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
from sqlalchemy import create_engine, inspect
from scripts.docker_entrypoint import INITIAL_REVISION, current_revision, run_migrations
from scripts.docker_entrypoint import HEAD_REVISION, INITIAL_REVISION, current_revision, run_migrations
def test_run_migrations_on_empty_sqlite(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ def test_run_migrations_on_empty_sqlite(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
tables = set(inspect(engine).get_table_names())
assert "users" in tables
assert current_revision(engine) == "20260714_0004"
assert current_revision(engine) == HEAD_REVISION
def test_run_migrations_stamps_existing_schema_without_alembic(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ def test_run_migrations_stamps_existing_schema_without_alembic(tmp_path, monkeyp
tables = set(inspect(engine).get_table_names())
assert "refresh_tokens" in tables
assert current_revision(engine) == "20260714_0004"
assert current_revision(engine) == HEAD_REVISION
assert INITIAL_REVISION == "20260711_0001"
@@ -98,4 +98,4 @@ def test_run_migrations_repairs_partial_schema_with_stale_alembic(tmp_path, monk
tables = set(inspect(engine).get_table_names())
assert "refresh_tokens" in tables
assert current_revision(engine) == "20260714_0004"
assert current_revision(engine) == HEAD_REVISION
+19
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,25 @@ import { expect, test } from "@playwright/test";
import { API_URL, adminLogin, loginViaUi, registerVerifyLogin, uniqueEmail } from "../helpers/api";
test.describe("§15.7 scenarios 5 & 9: Admin users", () => {
test("blocked user access token rejected immediately after block", async ({ request }) => {
const email = uniqueEmail("e2e-block-jwt");
const session = await registerVerifyLogin(request, email);
const admin = await adminLogin(request);
const adminToken = (await admin.json()).access_token;
const patch = await request.patch(`${API_URL}/api/v1/admin/users/${session.user.id}`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
data: { status: "blocked" }
});
expect(patch.ok()).toBeTruthy();
const me = await request.get(`${API_URL}/api/v1/users/me`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${session.accessToken}` }
});
expect(me.status()).toBe(401);
expect((await me.json()).detail).toBe("TOKEN_REVOKED");
});
test("admin blocks user → blocked user cannot login", async ({ page, request }) => {
const email = uniqueEmail("e2e-block");
const session = await registerVerifyLogin(request, email);
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import type { PropsWithChildren } from "react";
import { useAuth } from "@modules/auth";
import { useAuthStore } from "@modules/auth/store/authStore";
export function AdminGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element {
export function AdminGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element | null {
const bootstrapped = useAuthStore((state) => state.bootstrapped);
const auth = useAuth();
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import type { PropsWithChildren } from "react";
import { useAuth } from "@modules/auth";
import { useAuthStore } from "@modules/auth/store/authStore";
export function AuthGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element {
export function AuthGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element | null {
const bootstrapped = useAuthStore((state) => state.bootstrapped);
const auth = useAuth();
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import type { PropsWithChildren } from "react";
import { useAuth } from "@modules/auth";
import { useAuthStore } from "@modules/auth/store/authStore";
export function GuestGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element {
export function GuestGuard({ children }: PropsWithChildren): JSX.Element | null {
const bootstrapped = useAuthStore((state) => state.bootstrapped);
const auth = useAuth();
@@ -43,9 +43,21 @@ vi.mock("@shared/api/client", () => ({
}
return { data: { data: [], meta: { total: 0, page: 1, limit: 20 } } };
}),
patch: vi.fn(async () => ({
patch: vi.fn(async (url: string) => {
if (url === "/api/v1/admin/settings") {
return {
data: {
values: { enable_docs: false },
locks: {},
settings_path: "data/compton_settings.json",
secrets: {}
}
};
}
return {
data: { id: "1", email: "u@example.com", role: "user", is_superuser: false, status: "blocked" }
})),
};
}),
post: vi.fn(async (url: string) => {
if (url === "/api/v1/admin/users") {
return { data: { id: "1", email: "new@example.com", role: "user", is_superuser: false, status: "active" } };
@@ -95,7 +107,7 @@ describe("adminApi", () => {
expect((await resetAdminUserPassword("1", "Valid123A")).status).toBe("blocked");
expect((await deleteAdminUser("1")).status).toBe("deleted");
expect((await getAdminSettings()).settings_path).toBe("data/compton_settings.json");
expect((await patchAdminSettings({ enable_docs: false })).id).toBe("1");
expect((await patchAdminSettings({ enable_docs: false })).settings_path).toBe("data/compton_settings.json");
expect((await getAdminDiagnostics()).checks[0].status).toBe("ok");
expect((await getAdminActivityFeed()).events.length).toBe(1);
expect((await postAdminUiActivity("click")).status).toBe("ok");
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { QueryClient, QueryClientProvider } from "@tanstack/react-query";
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import { render, screen, within } from "@testing-library/react";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { AdminStats } from "./AdminStats";
@@ -23,9 +23,14 @@ describe("AdminStats", () => {
expect(await screen.findByText("CPU")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("WESP")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("nx throughput (instant)")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("users")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("10")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("3")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("2")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText("registrations today")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect((await screen.findAllByText("users")).length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
const statCards = document.querySelectorAll(".wesp-admin-stat-card");
expect(statCards).toHaveLength(4);
expect(within(statCards[0] as HTMLElement).getByText("10")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(within(statCards[1] as HTMLElement).getByText("3")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(within(statCards[2] as HTMLElement).getByText("2")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(within(statCards[3] as HTMLElement).getByText("1")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { authClient } from "@shared/api/client";
import { authClient, applyAuthHeader } from "@shared/api/client";
export interface LoginPayload {
email: string;
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ export async function register(payload: RegisterPayload) {
return data;
}
export async function logout() {
await authClient.post("/api/v1/auth/logout");
export async function logout(accessToken?: string | null) {
const headers = accessToken ? applyAuthHeader({}) : {};
await authClient.post("/api/v1/auth/logout", undefined, { headers });
}
export async function refresh() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export function useAuth() {
return data.user as AuthUser;
},
async logout() {
await apiLogout();
await apiLogout(accessToken);
clearSession();
},
async refreshSession() {
+4
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ apiClient.interceptors.response.use(
useAuthStore.getState().clearSession();
return Promise.reject(error);
}
if (error.response?.status === 401 && detail === "TOKEN_REVOKED") {
useAuthStore.getState().clearSession();
return Promise.reject(error);
}
const originalRequest = error.config as InternalAxiosRequestConfig & { _retry?: boolean };
if (error.response?.status !== 401 || !originalRequest || originalRequest._retry) {
return Promise.reject(error);
+1
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export default defineConfig({
exclude: ["e2e/**", "node_modules/**"],
environment: "jsdom",
setupFiles: ["src/__tests__/setup.ts"],
testTimeout: 10_000,
coverage: {
provider: "v8",
include: ["src/**/*.{ts,tsx}"],
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# Документация Compton
README в корне — только «как запустить за 30 секунд». Всё остальное — здесь.
Мы сознательно держим **мало файлов**, но каждый — **плотный**: таблицы, схемы, команды. Можно с лёгким юмором, но без простыней на 500 строк.
## Карта
| Документ | Когда открывать |
|----------|-----------------|
| [project.md](./project.md) | «Где что лежит?», архитектура, API, маршруты, env |
| [deploy.md](./deploy.md) | Запуск, **стандартные логины dev**, staging/prod, troubleshooting |
| [security.md](./security.md) | Auth, JWT revoke, секреты, nginx, чеклист prod |
| [release.md](./release.md) | Перед выкладкой: E2E, k6, ZAP, Lighthouse, smoke |
| [TZ.md](./TZ.md) | Полное ТЗ — источник правды по требованиям |
## Быстрые ссылки
```bash
# dev
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build
# тесты
pnpm --filter web test:ci
cd apps/api && python -m pytest --cov=app --cov-fail-under=90
# prod smoke (после деплоя)
./infra/scripts/smoke-prod.sh https://your-domain.com
```
## Что куда не кладём
| Не в git | Почему |
|----------|--------|
| `apps/api/data/secrets/install.env` | пароли БД, JWT, MinIO |
| `.env`, `apps/api/.env` | локальные секреты |
| `apps/api/data/logs/` | runtime-логи |
| `node_modules/`, `.venv/` | очевидно |
Если секрет утёк в git — считайте его скомпрометированным. Force-push не спасает совесть.
+196
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@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
# Деплой и эксплуатация
От «запустил на ноуте» до «живёт на VPS и не стыдно показать security.md».
## Среды
```mermaid
flowchart LR
Dev[docker-compose.yml] --> St[staging]
St --> QA[k6 + ZAP + E2E]
QA --> Prod[production]
```
| Среда | Compose | APP_ENV | Docs | Demo users |
|-------|---------|---------|------|------------|
| Dev | `docker-compose.yml` | development | ✅ | ✅ |
| CI/E2E | `docker-compose.test.yml` | test | ✅ | ✅ |
| Staging | `infra/docker/docker-compose.staging.yml` | staging | ❌ | ❌ |
| Production | `infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml` | production | ❌ | ❌ |
## Локальная разработка
```bash
# 1. venv + зависимости backend (один раз)
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r apps/api/requirements-dev.txt
# 2. Секреты установки (один раз, до первого docker compose up)
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
# 3. Полный стек в Docker (API + БД + web)
docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build
# 4. Проверка
curl http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health
```
| Сервис | URL |
|--------|-----|
| Web | http://localhost:5173 |
| API | http://localhost:8000 |
| PG/Redis/MinIO на хост | `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` → 5432, 6379, 9000/9001 |
> Bootstrap и локальные тесты (`pytest`, `mypy`) — через активированный `.venv`. Docker API использует свой образ; venv нужен для скриптов и разработки на хосте.
**Гибрид** (инфра в Docker, frontend локально):
```bash
source .venv/bin/activate
docker compose up -d
pnpm install
pnpm --filter web dev
```
**Install secrets на хост** (DBeaver): Admin → Security → Install Secrets → Reveal DB password.
### Стандартные логины (dev)
Создаются при seed на старте API. Пароли по умолчанию — из `apps/api/.env.example` (или дефолты в `config.py`).
| Email | Пароль | Env | Роль | Superuser | Куда заходит |
|-------|--------|-----|------|:---------:|--------------|
| `admin@compton.example` | `Admin1234` | `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` | admin | да | `/admin` — Users, Content, Security, Diagnostics, secrets |
| `ops@compton.example` | `OpsAdmin1234` | `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` | admin | нет | `/admin` — Users, Content, Activity (без Security) |
| `user@compton.example` | `User1234` | `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD` | user | — | `/profile` |
**CMS-страницы (seed):** `about`, `privacy`, `terms``/pages/about` и т.д.
> **Staging/production:** `SEED_DEMO_USERS=false` — demo `user@` и `ops@` **не создаются**, только admin + CMS. Пароль admin задаётся через `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` **до первого seed**, потом — сменить в UI.
## Staging
**Нужно:** VPS, DNS, TLS certs в `infra/docker/certs/`, SMTP.
```bash
git clone https://git.groupkomton.ru/Matvey/site.git && cd site
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
cp infra/docker/.env.staging.example infra/docker/.env.staging
# правим: домен, CORS, SMTP, ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD
./infra/docker/deploy-staging.sh
```
Проверка:
```bash
curl -fsS https://STAGING/api/v1/health
curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://STAGING/api/v1/docs # 404
./infra/scripts/health-check.sh https://STAGING
```
Nginx: `default.tls.conf` — 80→443, HSTS.
## Production
```bash
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
cp infra/docker/.env.production.example infra/docker/.env.production
./infra/docker/deploy-prod.sh infra/docker/.env.production
```
**Сразу после bootstrap:**
1. Бэкап `install.env` off-server (зашифровать)
2. Сменить пароль admin
| Сервис | Host ports |
|--------|------------|
| nginx | 80, 443 |
| api, web, pg, redis, minio | internal only |
```bash
./infra/scripts/smoke-prod.sh https://YOUR_DOMAIN
```
### Rollback
```bash
docker compose -f infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml down
git checkout PREVIOUS_TAG
./infra/docker/deploy-prod.sh infra/docker/.env.production
```
## Бэкапы и мониторинг
| Что | Команда / как |
|-----|---------------|
| PostgreSQL | `./infra/scripts/backup-postgres.sh``backups/postgres-*.sql.gz` |
| install.env | `cp …/install.env backups/install.env.$(date +%F).enc` + gpg |
| Uptime | `./infra/scripts/health-check.sh URL` или UptimeRobot на `/api/v1/health` + `/` |
| Логи | logrotate для `server.log`, `admin-audit.jsonl` |
## Восстановление секретов
`install.env` — единственный источник runtime-секретов. Потеряли — не генерируйте новый вслепую.
### Симптомы
- `password authentication failed for user "compton_app"`
- bootstrap после того, как Postgres volume уже создан
### Fix (есть бэкап)
```bash
docker compose down
# восстановить apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
docker compose up -d --build
```
### Fix (нет бэкапа)
| Вариант | Данные |
|---------|--------|
| Reveal из другой среды | сохраняются |
| `down -v` + bootstrap (**только dev**) | **удаляются все** |
```bash
docker compose --profile docker-web down -v
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
docker compose --profile docker-web up -d --build
```
## SMTP
Staging/prod: `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE=smtp`. Dev: `memory` (письма в RAM, SMTP не нужен).
| Env | Назначение |
|-----|------------|
| `SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_FROM` | сервер |
| `FRONTEND_URL` | ссылки в письмах |
## Troubleshooting
| Проблема | Решение |
|----------|---------|
| `install.env missing` | `python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py` |
| `password authentication failed` | [восстановление секретов](#восстановление-секретов) |
| Login failed | `curl …/health`, проверить `.env`, restart web |
| 401 refresh в консоли (гость) | норма на публичных страницах |
| Logout после F5 на `/admin` | rebuild web, перелогиниться |
| «На сайт» ведёт на login | должно быть `href="/"`, rebuild |
| Port 5173 busy | stop Docker web **или** local Vite |
| CORS | `VITE_USE_API_PROXY=true`, не бить напрямую :8000 |
| Нет Security/Diagnostics | логин `admin@`, не `ops@` |
| Docker web: missing modules | `docker compose … up -d --build web` |
## Compose-справочник
| Файл | Назначение |
|------|------------|
| `docker-compose.yml` | dev |
| `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` | порты на хост |
| `docker-compose.test.yml` | CI/E2E |
| `infra/docker/docker-compose.staging.yml` | staging |
| `infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml` | production |
Deploy: `infra/docker/deploy-staging.sh`, `deploy-prod.sh`.
+220
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@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
# Структура и архитектура
Monorepo-lite: статический лендинг + React SPA + FastAPI + PostgreSQL + Redis + MinIO.
Если вы искали микросервисы на Kubernetes — это другой коридор.
## Стек
| Слой | Технологии |
|------|------------|
| Frontend | React 19, TS, Vite, React Router, TanStack Query, Zustand, RHF+Zod, Ant Design |
| Backend | FastAPI, SQLAlchemy 2, Alembic, Pydantic v2 |
| Данные | PostgreSQL 16, Redis 7, MinIO |
| Инфра | Docker Compose, Nginx, GitHub Actions |
| Качество | Vitest, Playwright, pytest (≥90% / ≥85% cov) |
## Дерево репозитория
```
site/
├── apps/
│ ├── api/ # Backend
│ │ ├── app/
│ │ │ ├── core/ # crypto, jwt_denylist, redis, install_secrets…
│ │ │ ├── db/ # models, seed, migrations helpers
│ │ │ └── modules/ # auth, users, content, admin, media, test
│ │ ├── migrations/ # Alembic
│ │ ├── scripts/ # bootstrap_install.py, docker_entrypoint.py
│ │ ├── tests/
│ │ └── data/
│ │ ├── secrets/ # install.env (gitignore!)
│ │ └── logs/ # server.log, admin-audit.jsonl (gitignore)
│ └── web/
│ ├── index.html # лендинг /
│ ├── app.html # SPA entry
│ ├── main/ # статика лендинга (CSS/JS/video)
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── app/ # router, guards
│ │ ├── modules/ # auth, profile, admin, content, landing
│ │ ├── pages/
│ │ └── shared/ # api client, ui
│ └── e2e/ # Playwright
├── packages/ # eslint-config, shared-types (target)
├── infra/
│ ├── docker/ # staging/prod compose, deploy.sh
│ ├── nginx/ # default.conf, default.tls.conf
│ ├── k6/ # load test §17.2
│ └── scripts/ # backup, health, smoke
├── docs/ # вы здесь
├── docker-compose.yml # dev
└── docker-compose.test.yml # CI / E2E
```
## Runtime
```mermaid
flowchart TB
subgraph browser [Браузер]
L[index.html /]
S[app.html SPA]
end
subgraph edge [Nginx :80/:443]
N[TLS + headers]
end
subgraph internal [Docker internal]
W[web]
A[api]
PG[(PostgreSQL)]
R[(Redis)]
M[(MinIO)]
end
L --> N
S --> N
N --> W
N --> A
A --> PG
A --> R
A --> M
```
**Prod/staging:** наружу только nginx. Postgres, Redis, MinIO — без host-портов.
## Frontend
### Два входа (dual-entry)
| Entry | URL | Содержимое |
|-------|-----|------------|
| `index.html` | `/` | Маркетинговый лендинг (`main/`) |
| `app.html` | `/login`, `/admin`, … | React SPA |
Vite переписывает SPA-пути на `app.html` (`vite.main-static.ts`).
### Маршруты
| Путь | Guard | Кто |
|------|-------|-----|
| `/` | — | все |
| `/login`, `/register`, `/forgot-password`, `/reset-password` | GuestGuard | гости |
| `/verify`, `/pages/:slug` | — | публично |
| `/profile` | AuthGuard | user |
| `/admin` | AdminGuard | admin |
**Auth UX:**
- Access JWT — только в памяти (Zustand), не localStorage
- Refresh — HttpOnly cookie, `Path=/api/v1/auth`
- После login: admin → `/admin`, user → `/profile`
- Кнопка «На сайт» в админке — **полный** переход на `/` (не React Router)
### Админка (WESP-style)
| Раздел | Кому | Что |
|--------|------|-----|
| Users | admin | CRUD пользователей |
| Content | admin | CMS |
| Security | superuser | runtime settings, Install Secrets |
| Diagnostics | superuser | health checks |
| Activity | admin | audit feed, server log |
Тема Light/Dark — `localStorage.wespAdminTheme`. Auth-страницы — zootech-карточки (`#48816d`).
## Backend API
База: `/api/v1`
| Модуль | Эндпоинты (основное) |
|--------|----------------------|
| health | `GET /health` |
| auth | register, login, logout, refresh, verify, forgot/reset password |
| users | `GET/PATCH /me`, password, avatar |
| content | публичные pages + admin CRUD |
| admin | users, stats, settings, diagnostics, secrets, activity |
| media | подписанные URL файлов |
| test | `/test/emails/latest-token`**только** E2E |
### Core (`apps/api/app/core/`)
| Модуль | Зачем |
|--------|-------|
| `crypto.py` | bcrypt, JWT, HMAC, token hash — одна точка |
| `jwt_denylist.py` | мгновенный revoke access JWT |
| `install_secrets.py` | bootstrap + lock |
| `dependencies.py` | `get_current_user` |
| `redis.py` | rate limit + JWT revoke |
| `storage.py` | MinIO / memory |
## База данных
```mermaid
erDiagram
users ||--o| user_profiles : has
users ||--o{ refresh_tokens : owns
users ||--o{ password_reset_tokens : owns
users ||--o{ email_verification_tokens : owns
```
Таблицы: `users`, `user_profiles`, `refresh_tokens`, `password_reset_tokens`, `email_verification_tokens`, `content_pages`.
```bash
cd apps/api && alembic upgrade head
```
CHECK constraints на `role`, `status`; superuser только при `role=admin`. Cleanup expired tokens при старте API.
### Seed: стандартные логины (dev)
| Email | Пароль | Env |
|-------|--------|-----|
| admin@compton.example | Admin1234 | `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` |
| ops@compton.example | OpsAdmin1234 | `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` |
| user@compton.example | User1234 | `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD` |
CMS: `about`, `privacy`, `terms`. Подробнее — [deploy.md § логины](./deploy.md#стандартные-логины-dev).
## Переменные окружения (ключевые)
| Переменная | Где | Назначение |
|------------|-----|------------|
| `DATABASE_URL` | api | PostgreSQL |
| `APP_ENV` | api | development / staging / production |
| `JWT_ACCESS_SECRET`, `JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER` | api | токены |
| `REDIS_URL` | api | rate limit + JWT revoke (prod обязателен) |
| `SEED_DEMO_USERS` | api | `false` на staging/prod |
| `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` | api | пароль admin при seed (default `Admin1234`) |
| `DEMO_USER_PASSWORD`, `DEMO_OPS_PASSWORD` | api | demo user/ops (только dev) |
| `ENABLE_DOCS` | api | `false` на prod |
| `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES` | api | `true` только E2E |
| `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE` | api | `memory` (dev) / `smtp` (prod) |
| `STORAGE_MODE` | api | `s3` / `memory` |
| `VITE_API_URL` | web | `http://api:8000` в Docker |
| `VITE_USE_API_PROXY` | web | `true` в dev |
Полные примеры: `apps/api/.env.example`, `apps/api/.env.production.example`.
### Runtime settings
`apps/api/data/compton_settings.json` — toggles без секретов. Superuser: `GET/PATCH /admin/settings`. Env с тем же ключом = **lock** (нельзя менять из UI).
## Docker Compose
| Файл | Когда |
|------|-------|
| `docker-compose.yml` | локальная разработка |
| `docker-compose.dev-ports.yml` | PG/Redis/MinIO на хост (DBeaver) |
| `docker-compose.test.yml` | CI, Playwright |
| `infra/docker/docker-compose.staging.yml` | staging VPS |
| `infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml` | production VPS |
## CI
`.github/workflows/ci.yml`: lint → types → mypy → tests → audit → Bandit → gitleaks → E2E.
## Тесты
```bash
pnpm --filter web test:ci
cd apps/api && python -m pytest --cov=app --cov-fail-under=90
pnpm --filter web e2e
```
E2E поднимает API `:8001` + Vite `:5175`. Против staging: `E2E_BASE_URL=… E2E_START_API=false`.
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# MVP Regression Checklist
This checklist mirrors the required release scenarios.
1. Landing hero/marquee and reduced-motion behavior.
2. Register -> verify -> login -> profile edit -> logout.
3. Forgot password -> reset -> login.
4. Admin publish content -> public slug availability.
5. Admin blocks user -> blocked user login denied.
6. Pending user cannot access `/profile`.
7. Refresh token rotation and old token rejection.
8. IDOR check: user A cannot access user B.
9. Admin cannot demote/block self; last admin protected.
10. Avatar upload rejects invalid MIME/oversize/SVG.
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# Релиз и QA gates
Перед production не «авось прокатит», а чеклист из ТЗ §17. Если что-то красное — сначала staging, потом prod. Живёт один раз.
## Pipeline
```mermaid
flowchart TD
CI[CI green] --> ST[Staging + TLS]
ST --> E2E[E2E 11/11]
ST --> K6[k6 pass]
ST --> ZAP[ZAP 0 High/Crit]
ST --> LH[Lighthouse ≥ 85]
E2E --> PROD[Production deploy]
K6 --> PROD
ZAP --> PROD
LH --> PROD
PROD --> SM[smoke-prod.sh]
SM --> DNS[DNS cutover]
DNS --> MON[24h мониторинг]
```
## Регрессия E2E
**Последний локальный прогон:** 2026-07-14 — backend 137 / 90.43% cov, frontend 46.
### Staging
```bash
E2E_BASE_URL=https://staging.example.com E2E_START_API=false pnpm --filter web e2e
```
| # | Сценарий | Local | Staging |
|---|----------|:-----:|:-------:|
| 1 | Landing hero, reduced-motion | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2 | Register → verify → login → profile → logout | ☐ | ☐ |
| 3 | Forgot → reset → login | ☐ | ☐ |
| 4 | Admin publish → public slug | ☐ | ☐ |
| 5 | Block user → login denied | ☐ | ☐ |
| 6 | Pending → нет `/profile` | ☐ | ☐ |
| 7 | Refresh rotation | ☐ | ☐ |
| 8 | IDOR user A ≠ user B | ☐ | ☐ |
| 9 | Admin не блокирует себя / last admin | ☐ | ☐ |
| 10 | Avatar: bad MIME / size / SVG | ☐ | ☐ |
| 11 | Block → access JWT 401 TOKEN_REVOKED | ☐ | ☐ |
### Локально
```bash
pnpm --filter web e2e # API :8001, Vite :5175
```
## k6 (§17.2)
```bash
k6 run infra/k6/mvp-load-test.js -e BASE_URL=https://staging.example.com
```
| Параметр | Порог |
|----------|-------|
| VU / ramp | 50 / 5 min |
| Mix | 35% list, 25% login, 20% me, 10% refresh, 10% slug |
| p95 | < 300 ms |
| Errors | < 1% |
## OWASP ZAP
```bash
docker run --rm -v "$(pwd):/zap/wrk:rw" -t ghcr.io/zap/zaproxy:stable \
zap-baseline.py -t https://staging.example.com -r zap-report.html
```
| Severity | Pass |
|----------|------|
| High, Critical | **0** |
Medium/Low — review руками. `zap-report.html` — в архив релиза.
## Lighthouse
```bash
npx lighthouse https://staging.example.com \
--preset=mobile --only-categories=performance \
--output=json --output-path=./lighthouse-report.json
```
| Метрика | ≥ |
|---------|---|
| Performance (mobile, `/`) | 85 |
Не прошло — hero video `preload="none"`, font swap, меньше JS на лендинге.
## Release gates (сводка)
- [ ] CI green на `main`
- [ ] E2E 11/11 на staging
- [ ] k6 pass
- [ ] ZAP 0 High/Critical
- [ ] Lighthouse ≥ 85
- [ ] [security.md](./security.md) staging-пункты
- [ ] `./infra/scripts/smoke-prod.sh` на prod
- [ ] DNS cutover + rollback plan (previous tag)
## CI локально
```bash
pnpm lint && pnpm typecheck
cd apps/api && python -m mypy app
pnpm --filter web test:ci
cd apps/api && python -m pytest --cov=app --cov-fail-under=90
```
Полный pipeline: `.github/workflows/ci.yml`.
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# Install Secrets Recovery
This project keeps runtime installation secrets in `apps/api/data/secrets/install.env`.
## Important
- Do not rotate `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `JWT_ACCESS_SECRET`, or `JWT_REFRESH_PEPPER` automatically after first bootstrap.
- A mismatch between `install.env` and initialized Postgres volume can break database access.
## Safe recovery steps
1. Stop services:
- `docker compose down`
2. Restore `apps/api/data/secrets/install.env` from backup.
3. Start services:
- `docker compose up -d --build`
If backup is unavailable, you have two options:
- Preferred: recover credentials directly from running database/admin secret reveal in another environment.
- Last resort: reset local volumes and lose local dev data:
- `docker compose down -v`
- `python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py`
- `docker compose up -d --build`
## Dev access ports
To expose DB/Redis/MinIO to host tools:
- `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev-ports.yml up -d`
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# Security Checklist (MVP Pre-Production)
- [x] Access JWT is memory-only in frontend state (no sessionStorage/localStorage persistence).
- [x] Refresh token is HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite cookie on `/api/v1/auth` path.
- [x] Auth endpoints implemented with neutral anti-enumeration messaging.
- [x] Origin/Referer validation is enforced for auth endpoints.
- [x] Authenticated/admin route guards and role checks are enforced, including `SUPERUSER_ONLY` checks for critical endpoints.
- [x] Content sanitization is enabled for CMS HTML body.
- [x] Security headers configured in `infra/nginx/default.conf`.
- [x] CI includes dependency audit, Bandit, and gitleaks scans.
- [x] Settings runtime supports `data/compton_settings.json` with env lock behavior.
- [x] Admin audit feed is persisted to `data/logs/admin-audit.jsonl`.
- [x] Install secrets bootstrap is enabled (`apps/api/data/secrets/install.env`) and locked after first run.
- [x] Database, Redis and MinIO are internal by default in base docker compose.
- [x] `refresh` validates user status and rate limit is checked before token rotation.
- [x] CMS sanitization enforces allowed URL protocols (`http`, `https`, `mailto`).
- [x] Admin password create/reset uses shared password policy validators.
- [ ] Production docs endpoint switch (`ENABLE_DOCS=false`) validated in staging/prod env.
- [ ] HSTS behavior validated behind TLS ingress in staging/prod.
- [ ] Recovery runbook for lost `install.env` tested (`docs/secrets-recovery.md`).
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# Безопасность
Compton MVP — не банк, но и не «admin/admin в prod». Ниже — как устроена защита и что проверить перед выкладкой.
## Auth: схема
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant B as Браузер
participant API as FastAPI
participant RD as Redis
participant PG as PostgreSQL
B->>API: POST /auth/login
API->>PG: bcrypt verify
API->>RD: read auth_epoch
API-->>B: access JWT (memory) + refresh cookie
B->>API: GET /users/me + Bearer
API->>RD: jti denied? epoch ok?
alt revoked
API-->>B: 401 TOKEN_REVOKED
else ok
API-->>B: 200
end
B->>API: POST /auth/logout
API->>RD: deny_jti + revoke refresh
API-->>B: cookie cleared
```
## Токены
| Токен | Где живёт | Отзыв |
|-------|-----------|-------|
| Access JWT | память frontend | jti denylist + auth_epoch (Redis) |
| Refresh | HttpOnly cookie | rotation + family reuse detection |
| Email/reset | opaque → hash в БД | one-time, TTL 1ч |
JWT claims: `sub`, `role`, `jti`, `auth_epoch`, `exp`.
### Мгновенный revoke
`apps/api/app/core/jwt_denylist.py`:
| Redis key | Смысл |
|-----------|-------|
| `jwt:deny:{jti}` | конкретный access-токен |
| `auth:epoch:{user_id}` | версия сессий пользователя |
| Событие | Действие |
|---------|----------|
| Logout | deny jti + revoke refresh |
| Block | INCR epoch + revoke refresh |
| Смена/reset пароля | INCR epoch + revoke refresh |
**Production:** без Redis API не стартует. Redis упал — fail-closed (401, не «ну ладно»).
**Dev:** in-memory fallback (не путать с prod).
## Криптография
Всё через `apps/api/app/core/crypto.py`:
| Данные | Метод |
|--------|-------|
| Пароли | bcrypt cost 12 |
| Access JWT | HS256 |
| Refresh/email tokens | SHA-256 + pepper |
| Media URLs | HMAC-SHA256 + TTL |
| Install secrets | `secrets.token_*`, generate-once + lock |
## Install secrets
```bash
python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py # до первого docker compose up
```
| Файл | Содержимое |
|------|------------|
| `data/secrets/install.env` | PG, JWT, S3, MinIO |
| `install.meta.json` | install ID, lock time |
**Не ротировать** `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` / JWT после bootstrap без плана — иначе Postgres скажет фразу, которую вы уже видели, и будет прав.
Reveal: Admin → Security → Install Secrets (superuser, аудит в `admin-audit.jsonl`).
Восстановление: [deploy.md § восстановление](./deploy.md#восстановление-секретов).
## RBAC
| Правило | Enforcement |
|---------|-------------|
| `/admin` → role=admin | Guard + API |
| Security/Diagnostics/secrets → superuser | API + UI tabs |
| Нельзя block/demote себя | admin service |
| Last admin protected | admin service |
| blocked/pending → 403 refresh | auth service |
| forgot_password skip для blocked | auth service |
| IDOR на профиль | users router |
## HTTP / инфра
### Nginx headers
| Header | Значение |
|--------|----------|
| X-Frame-Options | DENY |
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff |
| Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| HSTS | `default.tls.conf` (staging/prod) |
### Прочее
- Origin/Referer на cookie-auth endpoints
- Rate limit (prod: обязателен)
- CMS: bleach, протоколы http/https/mailto
- Avatar: jpeg/png/webp, re-encode, **SVG — нет**
- CI: Bandit, pip-audit, gitleaks, npm audit
- Postgres/Redis/MinIO — internal network
- Firewall VPS: 22, 80, 443
## Production guards
`APP_ENV=production` → API **не стартует**, если:
| Проблема | Env |
|----------|-----|
| Test routes | `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES=true` |
| OpenAPI | `ENABLE_DOCS=true` |
| Rate limit off | `ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT=false` |
| Cookie без Secure | `COOKIE_SECURE=false` |
| Placeholder JWT | `change-me-*` |
| Дефолтная БД | user:pass |
| Без SSL mode | нет `sslmode=require` |
| Без Redis | JWT revocation |
## Prod env (минимум)
| Переменная | Значение |
|------------|----------|
| `APP_ENV` | production |
| `ENABLE_DOCS` | false |
| `ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES` | false |
| `COOKIE_SECURE` | true |
| `ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT` | true |
| `EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE` | smtp |
| `SEED_DEMO_USERS` | false |
| `DATABASE_URL` | …?sslmode=require |
## Чеклист
### Сделано в коде
- [x] JWT в memory, refresh HttpOnly
- [x] Anti-enumeration auth
- [x] Origin/Referer validation
- [x] RBAC + superuser
- [x] CMS sanitization
- [x] Nginx security headers
- [x] CI security scans
- [x] Install secrets bootstrap + lock
- [x] JWT jti denylist + auth_epoch
- [x] Admin audit log
### Проверить на staging
- [ ] `/api/v1/docs` → 404
- [ ] HSTS за TLS
- [ ] Dry-run recovery секретов
- [ ] ZAP: 0 High/Critical → [release.md](./release.md)
- [ ] k6 pass → [release.md](./release.md)
- [ ] Lighthouse ≥ 85 на `/`
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# Copy to infra/docker/.env.production and fill in production values.
FRONTEND_URL=https://compton.example.com
PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://compton.example.com
CORS_ORIGINS=["https://compton.example.com"]
TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8
SMTP_HOST=smtp.example.com
SMTP_PORT=587
SMTP_USER=
SMTP_PASSWORD=
SMTP_FROM=noreply@compton.example.com
TLS_CERT_DIR=./certs
ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=ChangeMeProductionAdmin1234
SEED_DEMO_USERS=false
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# Copy to infra/docker/.env.staging and fill in domain/SMTP values.
FRONTEND_URL=https://staging.example.com
PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://staging.example.com
CORS_ORIGINS=["https://staging.example.com"]
TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8
SMTP_HOST=smtp.example.com
SMTP_PORT=587
SMTP_USER=
SMTP_PASSWORD=
SMTP_FROM=noreply@example.com
TLS_CERT_DIR=./certs
ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=ChangeMeStagingAdmin1234
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# Docker notes
# Docker deployment
`docker-compose.yml` is for local development.
`docker-compose.test.yml` is for CI-like integration and e2e testing.
Краткая справка. Подробный runbook: [docs/deploy.md](../../docs/deploy.md).
| Файл | Среда |
|------|-------|
| [`../../docker-compose.yml`](../../docker-compose.yml) | Локальная разработка |
| [`../../docker-compose.test.yml`](../../docker-compose.test.yml) | CI / E2E |
| [`docker-compose.staging.yml`](docker-compose.staging.yml) | Staging VPS |
| [`docker-compose.prod.yml`](docker-compose.prod.yml) | Production VPS |
## Staging
```bash
cp infra/docker/.env.staging.example infra/docker/.env.staging
# TLS: infra/docker/certs/fullchain.pem, privkey.pem
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
./infra/docker/deploy-staging.sh
```
## Production
```bash
cp infra/docker/.env.production.example infra/docker/.env.production
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
./infra/docker/deploy-prod.sh infra/docker/.env.production
```
## QA на staging
См. [docs/release.md](../../docs/release.md): E2E, k6, ZAP, Lighthouse.
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
cd "$ROOT"
ENV_FILE="${1:-infra/docker/.env.production}"
if [[ ! -f "$ENV_FILE" ]]; then
echo "Missing $ENV_FILE — copy infra/docker/.env.production.example first."
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f apps/api/data/secrets/install.env ]]; then
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
fi
docker compose \
-f infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml \
--env-file "$ENV_FILE" \
up -d --build
echo "Production deploy complete."
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
cd "$ROOT"
ENV_FILE="${1:-infra/docker/.env.staging}"
if [[ ! -f "$ENV_FILE" ]]; then
echo "Missing $ENV_FILE — copy infra/docker/.env.staging.example first."
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f apps/api/data/secrets/install.env ]]; then
python3 apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
fi
docker compose \
-f infra/docker/docker-compose.staging.yml \
--env-file "$ENV_FILE" \
up -d --build
echo "Staging deploy complete. Verify: curl -k https://\$(grep FRONTEND_URL $ENV_FILE | cut -d= -f2)/api/v1/health"
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# Production stack — VPS deploy.
# Usage:
# python apps/api/scripts/bootstrap_install.py
# cp infra/docker/.env.production.example infra/docker/.env.production
# docker compose -f infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml --env-file infra/docker/.env.production up -d --build
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
volumes:
- prod_postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
networks:
- internal
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
networks:
- internal
minio:
image: minio/minio
restart: unless-stopped
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
volumes:
- prod_minio_data:/data
networks:
- internal
api:
build:
context: ../../apps/api
dockerfile: Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
APP_ENV: production
ENABLE_DOCS: "false"
ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES: "false"
COOKIE_SECURE: "true"
ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT: "true"
EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE: smtp
STORAGE_MODE: s3
S3_ENDPOINT: http://minio:9000
REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
SEED_DEMO_USERS: "false"
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
- .env.production
volumes:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets:/app/data/secrets
- prod_api_logs:/app/data/logs
depends_on:
- postgres
- redis
- minio
networks:
- internal
web:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: apps/web/Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
VITE_USE_API_PROXY: "true"
VITE_API_URL: http://api:8000
depends_on:
- api
networks:
- internal
nginx:
image: nginx:stable-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ../nginx/default.tls.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro
- ${TLS_CERT_DIR:-./certs}:/etc/nginx/certs:ro
depends_on:
- web
- api
networks:
- internal
networks:
internal:
driver: bridge
volumes:
prod_postgres_data:
prod_minio_data:
prod_api_logs:
+78 -4
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,83 @@
# Staging stack — VPS deploy (no bind mounts, production-like settings).
# Usage:
# cp infra/docker/.env.staging.example infra/docker/.env.staging
# docker compose -f infra/docker/docker-compose.staging.yml --env-file infra/docker/.env.staging up -d --build
services:
web:
image: compton/web:staging
postgres:
image: postgres:16
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
volumes:
- staging_postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
minio:
image: minio/minio
restart: unless-stopped
command: server /data --console-address ":9001"
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
volumes:
- staging_minio_data:/data
api:
image: compton/api:staging
build:
context: ../../apps/api
dockerfile: Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
APP_ENV: staging
ENABLE_DOCS: "false"
ENABLE_TEST_ROUTES: "false"
COOKIE_SECURE: "true"
ENABLE_RATE_LIMIT: "true"
EMAIL_DELIVERY_MODE: smtp
STORAGE_MODE: s3
S3_ENDPOINT: http://minio:9000
REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
SEED_DEMO_USERS: "false"
env_file:
- ../../apps/api/.env.example
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets/install.env
- .env.staging
volumes:
- ../../apps/api/data/secrets:/app/data/secrets
- staging_api_logs:/app/data/logs
depends_on:
- postgres
- redis
- minio
web:
build:
context: ../..
dockerfile: apps/web/Dockerfile
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
VITE_USE_API_PROXY: "true"
VITE_API_URL: http://api:8000
depends_on:
- api
nginx:
image: nginx:stable-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ../nginx/default.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro
- ../nginx/default.tls.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro
- ${TLS_CERT_DIR:-./certs}:/etc/nginx/certs:ro
depends_on:
- web
- api
volumes:
staging_postgres_data:
staging_minio_data:
staging_api_logs:
+40 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
import http from "k6/http";
import { check, sleep } from "k6";
const BASE_URL = __ENV.BASE_URL || "http://localhost:8000";
const ADMIN_EMAIL = __ENV.ADMIN_EMAIL || "admin@compton.example";
const ADMIN_PASSWORD = __ENV.ADMIN_PASSWORD || "Admin1234";
export const options = {
stages: [
{ duration: "1m", target: 10 },
@@ -14,7 +18,41 @@ export const options = {
};
export default function () {
const contentList = http.get("http://localhost:8000/api/v1/content/pages");
check(contentList, { "content list is 200": (r) => r.status === 200 });
const roll = Math.random();
if (roll < 0.35) {
const res = http.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/content/pages`);
check(res, { "content list 200": (r) => r.status === 200 });
} else if (roll < 0.6) {
const res = http.post(
`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/login`,
JSON.stringify({ email: ADMIN_EMAIL, password: ADMIN_PASSWORD }),
{ headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
);
check(res, { "login 200": (r) => r.status === 200 });
if (res.status === 200) {
const token = res.json("access_token");
const me = http.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/users/me`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }
});
check(me, { "users me 200": (r) => r.status === 200 });
}
} else if (roll < 0.7) {
const login = http.post(
`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/login`,
JSON.stringify({ email: ADMIN_EMAIL, password: ADMIN_PASSWORD }),
{ headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
);
if (login.status === 200) {
const refresh = http.post(`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/refresh`, null, {
headers: { Cookie: login.headers["Set-Cookie"] || "" }
});
check(refresh, { "refresh ok": (r) => r.status === 200 || r.status === 401 });
}
} else {
const res = http.get(`${BASE_URL}/api/v1/content/pages/about`);
check(res, { "content slug": (r) => r.status === 200 || r.status === 404 });
}
sleep(1);
}
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name _;
ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/privkey.pem;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self';" always;
location /api/ {
proxy_pass http://api:8000;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location / {
proxy_pass http://web:5173;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
}
}
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
BACKUP_DIR="$ROOT/backups"
mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"
STAMP="$(date +%F-%H%M)"
FILE="$BACKUP_DIR/postgres-$STAMP.sql.gz"
docker compose -f "$ROOT/infra/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml" exec -T postgres \
pg_dump -U "${POSTGRES_USER:-compton_app}" "${POSTGRES_DB:-compton}" | gzip > "$FILE"
echo "Backup written: $FILE"
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
BASE="${1:-http://localhost:8000}"
BASE="${BASE%/}"
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $1"
exit 1
}
code="$(curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$BASE/api/v1/health" || echo 000)"
[[ "$code" == "200" ]] || fail "health returned $code"
root_code="$(curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "${BASE%/api/v1/health}/" 2>/dev/null || curl -fsS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$(echo "$BASE" | sed 's|:8000||')/" || echo 000)"
echo "Landing/root HTTP: $root_code"
echo "OK: health check passed"
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
BASE="${1:-http://127.0.0.1:8000}"
BASE="${BASE%/}"
echo "== Smoke: health =="
curl -fsS "$BASE/api/v1/health" | grep -q '"status":"ok"'
echo "== Smoke: docs disabled =="
docs_code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$BASE/api/v1/docs")"
[[ "$docs_code" == "404" || "$docs_code" == "307" ]] || { echo "Expected docs 404, got $docs_code"; exit 1; }
echo "== Smoke: public content =="
curl -fsS "$BASE/api/v1/content/pages" | grep -q '"data"'
echo "All smoke checks passed."